Wakilii

Saverino Twinobusingye v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 47 of 2011)

Constitutional Court · [2012] UGCC 1 · 2012 Petition Partly Allowed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Constitutional petition under Article 137(3) challenging the constitutionality of parliamentary resolutions
Decision
Petition partly succeeded; Resolution 9(c) declared unconstitutional and void, while Resolutions 9(a) and 9(b) were upheld as constitutional and the injunction against Parliament was lifted.

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Holding

The Court considered a petition challenging three parliamentary resolutions arising from a debate on oil-sector bribery allegations. The majority held that Parliament has no constitutional power to direct the Prime Minister or a Minister to step aside; under Articles 108A, 116 and 118 the power to remove them vests in the President, so Resolution 9(c) was unconstitutional and void. However, setting up the ad-hoc investigating committee under Article 90 (Resolution 9(a)) and requiring its members to observe high moral standards (Resolution 9(b)) were constitutional, the latter merely stating the obvious. The petition partly succeeded. Kavuma JA dissented, finding the entire process and the committee unconstitutional for breaching natural justice.

Facts

The petitioner, an advocate of the High Court and a regular observer of parliamentary proceedings, attended Parliament in October and November 2011 when it debated allegations of bribery in the oil sector involving several government ministers. The debate was emotive: some members described the named ministers as thieves and called for drastic action. Parliament passed three resolutions: Resolution 9(a) established an ad-hoc committee to investigate the bribery allegations and report within three months; Resolution 9(b) required the committee's members to observe high moral standards; and Resolution 9(c) directed the Prime Minister, Amama Mbabazi, and Ministers Sam Kutesa and Hillary Onek to step aside from office with immediate effect pending the investigation. A police investigating officer deposed that he had found the allegations baseless and the supporting documents forged. The petitioner challenged the resolutions as inconsistent with the Constitution, contending they breached the ministers' rights to a fair hearing and the presumption of innocence and exceeded Parliament's powers.

Issues

  1. Whether the petition raises a cause of action and the petitioner has locus standi.
  2. Whether Resolution 9(c), directing the Prime Minister and two Ministers to step aside from office pending investigation, is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution.
  3. Whether Parliament acted unconstitutionally in setting up an ad-hoc committee under Resolution 9(a) to investigate the allegations against the Prime Minister and Ministers.
  4. Whether Resolution 9(b), requiring members of the ad-hoc committee to observe high moral standards, is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution.

Orders

  • The petition raised a cause of action and the petitioner had locus standi to lodge and prosecute it.
  • Resolution 9(c), requiring the Prime Minister and other Ministers to step aside with immediate effect pending investigations and a report of the Ad-hoc committee, is unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
  • Resolution 9(a), which set up the Ad-hoc committee and its membership to investigate the allegations, is constitutional.
  • Resolution 9(b), requiring members of the Ad-hoc committee to observe high moral standards, merely emphasises the obvious and is constitutional.
  • The injunction issued to Parliament to halt its investigations pending disposal of the petition is lifted.
  • The petitioner is awarded two-thirds of the costs of the petition, with a certificate for two counsel.

Key headnotes

Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers — Removal and Vacation of Public Office
Parliament has no power under the Constitution to order the Prime Minister or a Minister to step aside or vacate office; that power vests in the President under Articles 108A, 116 and 118, save where the holder resigns, dies or becomes disqualified to be a Member of Parliament.
Constitutional Law — Parliamentary Committees — Article 90
Parliament is empowered by Article 90 to appoint standing and ad-hoc committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions, and such committees enjoy the powers of the High Court to enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents.
Constitutional Law — Internal Proceedings of Parliament — Limits of Judicial Interference
The courts will not interfere with the legitimate internal workings of Parliament, but may adjudicate where an aggrieved person alleges under Article 137(3) that Parliament has acted in contravention of the Constitution.
Administrative Law — Natural Justice — Premature Challenge to an Investigating Tribunal
A complaint that an investigating committee clothed with the powers of the High Court will deny a fair hearing is premature before that committee concludes its work; an aggrieved party retains recourse to the courts where the committee misdirects itself in law or acts unreasonably.
Constitutional Law — Accountability — Stepping Aside from Public Office
Stepping aside from public office pending investigation is a voluntary measure taken individually by the office-holder, with the consent of the President, and cannot be imposed by parliamentary direction.

Legislation cited (14)

  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.2
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.28
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.42
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.44(c)
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.79(3)
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.90
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.97
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.107
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.108A
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.116
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.118
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 art.137(3)
  • Constitution of Uganda 1995 National Objective and Directive Principle of State Policy XXVI
  • Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act Cap 258

Cases cited (10)

  • Uganda Law Society and Another v Attorney General (Constitutional Petitions Nos. 2 and 8 of 2002)
  • M'membe and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (1996) 1 LRL 584
  • Paul Ssemwogerere v Attorney General (Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2000)
  • Ananias Tumukunde v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 4 of 2009)
  • Caroline Turyatemba and Others v Attorney General and Others (Constitutional Petition No. 15 of 2006)
  • Brigadier Henry Tumukunde v Attorney General (Constitutional Appeal No. 2 of 2006)
  • Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
  • Major General David Tinyefuza v Attorney General (Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1997)
  • De Souza v Tanga Town Council (Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1960) [1961] EA 377
  • Okello Okello Livingstone and Others v Attorney General and Another (Constitutional Petition No. 4 of 2005)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.