Aramanani Kampayani v Uganda [1990] UGSC 6

Supreme Court · 1990 Conviction Quashed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download

Jurisdiction

Uganda

Case Type

Criminal appeal from a High Court murder conviction and death sentence.

Decision

Appeal allowed; murder conviction quashed, death sentence set aside, and appellant released.

The full judgment

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Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the murder conviction. Contentious and vital prosecution evidence was irregularly received: a postmortem report was admitted under section 30(b) of the Evidence Act without the requisite foundation, and the appellant's extra-judicial statement was admitted under section 64 of the Trial on Indictment Decree without any determination of voluntariness, occasioning a miscarriage of justice. The purported confession was, in truth, no confession; it admitted only knowledge of the principal's plan and ordinary employment errands. Neither it nor the remaining evidence connected the appellant, a mere driver, to the killers. The proof fell far short of establishing aiding and abetting beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

Bitwire, a Kabale businessman, plotted to kill a rival businessman, the deceased. The appellant was Bitwire's driver and employee. On Bitwire's instructions the appellant fetched a man from Kampala who recruited would-be assassins, later drove a group of gunmen to a forest to test-fire pistols, and on the fatal evening drove Bitwire to the deceased's home. As they were leaving, three men were seen near the gate, and the deceased was shortly afterwards shot by unknown gunmen and died after surgery. The appellant maintained that he acted only as an employee, feared Bitwire, and did not know the deceased would be killed. Bitwire had earlier been convicted of the murder but was acquitted on appeal some six months before the appellant's trial. The appellant was convicted of murder as an aider and abettor and sentenced to death.

Issues

Whether contentious or vital prosecution evidence was properly admitted under section 64 of the Trial on Indictment Decree without being formally proved by the witnesses giving oral evidence.
Whether the postmortem report was properly admitted under section 30(b) of the Evidence Act in the absence of evidence that the maker could not be procured without unreasonable delay or expense.
Whether the appellant's extra-judicial statement was admissible where the trial court did not satisfy itself that it was made voluntarily and held no trial within a trial.
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant aided and abetted the murder of the deceased.

Orders

Appeal allowed.
Conviction quashed.
Sentence set aside.
Appellant released.

Key headnotes

Evidence — Admission of agreed facts — Section 64 Trial on Indictment Decree — Contentious or vital witnesses

Section 64 of the Trial on Indictment Decree should normally be applied only to formal or non-contentious evidence; where a witness is controversial or vital, that witness must give oral evidence so that it can be tested in cross-examination and the witness's demeanour observed.

Evidence — Documentary hearsay — Section 30(b) Evidence Act — Foundation for absent witness

A statement of an absent witness may be admitted under section 30(b) of the Evidence Act only where the party tendering it proves that the witness cannot be found or that attendance cannot be procured without unreasonable delay or expense; absent such proof the document is wrongly admitted and must be excluded.

Evidence — Confessions — Voluntariness — Sections 24 and 25 Evidence Act

A trial court must satisfy itself that an extra-judicial confession was made voluntarily before admitting it, and this duty applies whether or not a trial within a trial is held.

Evidence — Confessions — Nature of a confession

A statement that admits only knowledge of another person's criminal plan and the performance of ordinary employment duties is not a confession to the offence charged.

Criminal Law — Aiding and abetting — Section 21(1)(b) Penal Code — Proof of participation

Mere employment by, and the performance of errands for, a principal offender, without knowledge of or any connection to the actual killers, does not establish aiding and abetting murder; participation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Legislation cited (7)

Trial on Indictment Decree 1971 s.64
Trial on Indictment Decree 1971 s.63
Evidence Act s.30(b)
Evidence Act s.24
Evidence Act s.25
Penal Code Act s.21(1)(b)
Penal Code Act s.189

Cases cited (6)

Fabiano Olukuudo v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1977)
Associated Architects v Christine Nazziwa (Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1981)
Muzamiri Kisongo and another v San Birabwa (Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1980)
Beronda v Uganda [1974] EA 46
Yowana Serwadda V Uganda (1978) C.A.U Judgement 128
Criminal Appeal No.23 of 1985

Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.