Wakilii

Hannington Wasswa & Anor v Maria Onyango Ochola & 3 Ors (Civil Appeal 3 of 1992)

Supreme Court · [1992] UGSC 5 · 1992 Appeal Dismissed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Civil appeal to the Supreme Court against a High Court order extending time to institute an appeal from the Chief Magistrate's Court.
Decision
Appeal dismissed; High Court order extending time to appeal upheld.

The full judgment

Read the complete, verbatim text of this judgment.

Cited — treatment unverified cited in 7 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions — always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court judge had properly exercised his discretion in finding good cause to extend time for filing an appeal, where the delay was caused by the lower court's failure to supply copies of the proceedings. An appellate court will not interfere with a discretionary extension unless the judge misdirected himself and reached a wrong decision, or was clearly wrong such that injustice resulted. Although the judge wrongly invoked the inherent power under s.101 (which cannot extend a statutory limitation period) and ought not to have relied on his personal knowledge of court procedure, these errors did not affect the real basis of the decision and caused no miscarriage of justice.

Facts

The respondents (administrators) sought to appeal to the High Court against a ruling of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Mengo delivered on 29 November 1985. On 11 December 1985 they filed a notice of appeal in both the Mengo and High Court registries, stating they would file a memorandum of appeal upon receiving the record of proceedings. Obtaining the record proved difficult and took about eighteen months. The memorandum of appeal was filed on 27 May 1987 after the record was received. Mukanza J heard and determined the appeal ex parte on 9 February 1988, but Tsekooko J later struck it out on the ground that the memorandum had been filed out of time and without leave. The administrators applied to Okalebo Ag. J to extend time; he found good cause shown, attributing the delay to the courts' failure to supply copies promptly, and granted the extension with costs in the cause. The appellants appealed that order to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in finding that good cause had been shown to extend the time for instituting the appeal.
  2. Whether the judge erred in relying on his own personal knowledge of court practice and procedure rather than on evidence.
  3. Whether the inherent power of the court under s.101 of the Civil Procedure Act could be used to extend a statutory period of limitation.
  4. Whether the order that costs be in the cause was proper.

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondents.

Key headnotes

Civil Procedure — Appeals — Extension of Time — Appellate Interference with Discretion
An appellate court will not interfere with a judge's discretionary extension of time unless the judge misdirected himself and thereby reached a wrong decision, or was clearly wrong such that injustice resulted.
Civil Procedure — Limitation — Good Cause to Admit an Appeal Out of Time
Delay in instituting an appeal caused by the court's own failure to supply copies of the decree and proceedings constitutes good cause for admitting an appeal after the limitation period under s.80 of the Civil Procedure Act has elapsed.
Civil Procedure — Inherent Powers — Statutory Limitation Periods
The inherent power of the court does not extend to altering a statutory period of limitation, except as the statute itself provides for extending the period.
Evidence — Judicial Notice — Judge's Personal Knowledge of Procedure
A judge should not import his own personal knowledge or experience of court procedure into a case; he must act on formally introduced evidence, save for facts properly the subject of judicial notice.

Legislation cited (10)

  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.80
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.80(1)
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.80(2)
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.101
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.1(2)
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.1(1)
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.8
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.10(1)
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.10(2)
  • Supreme Court Rules r.4

Cases cited (4)

  • Mbogo v Shah [1968] EA 93
  • Evans v Bartlam [1937] 2 All ER 646
  • Ingram v Percival [1968] WLR 663
  • Bikitana Transport Bus Co Ltd v Biribwona [1979] HCB 95
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.