Hannington Wasswa & Anor v Maria Onyango Ochola & 3 Ors (Civil Appeal 3 of 1992)
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Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court judge had properly exercised his discretion in finding good cause to extend time for filing an appeal, where the delay was caused by the lower court's failure to supply copies of the proceedings. An appellate court will not interfere with a discretionary extension unless the judge misdirected himself and reached a wrong decision, or was clearly wrong such that injustice resulted. Although the judge wrongly invoked the inherent power under s.101 (which cannot extend a statutory limitation period) and ought not to have relied on his personal knowledge of court procedure, these errors did not affect the real basis of the decision and caused no miscarriage of justice.
Facts
The respondents (administrators) sought to appeal to the High Court against a ruling of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Mengo delivered on 29 November 1985. On 11 December 1985 they filed a notice of appeal in both the Mengo and High Court registries, stating they would file a memorandum of appeal upon receiving the record of proceedings. Obtaining the record proved difficult and took about eighteen months. The memorandum of appeal was filed on 27 May 1987 after the record was received. Mukanza J heard and determined the appeal ex parte on 9 February 1988, but Tsekooko J later struck it out on the ground that the memorandum had been filed out of time and without leave. The administrators applied to Okalebo Ag. J to extend time; he found good cause shown, attributing the delay to the courts' failure to supply copies promptly, and granted the extension with costs in the cause. The appellants appealed that order to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in finding that good cause had been shown to extend the time for instituting the appeal.
- Whether the judge erred in relying on his own personal knowledge of court practice and procedure rather than on evidence.
- Whether the inherent power of the court under s.101 of the Civil Procedure Act could be used to extend a statutory period of limitation.
- Whether the order that costs be in the cause was proper.
Orders
- Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondents.
Key headnotes
Legislation cited (10)
- Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.80
- Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.80(1)
- Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.80(2)
- Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.101
- Civil Procedure Act (Cap 65) s.1(2)
- Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.1(1)
- Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.8
- Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.10(1)
- Civil Procedure Rules Order XXXIX r.10(2)
- Supreme Court Rules r.4
Cases cited (4)
- Mbogo v Shah [1968] EA 93
- Evans v Bartlam [1937] 2 All ER 646
- Ingram v Percival [1968] WLR 663
- Bikitana Transport Bus Co Ltd v Biribwona [1979] HCB 95