Wakilii

Kifamunte Henry v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 10 of 1997)

Supreme Court · [1998] UGSC 20 · 1998 Appeal Dismissed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Second criminal appeal from a Court of Appeal decision confirming a High Court conviction and death sentence for murder
Decision
Appeal dismissed; conviction for murder and sentence of death confirmed.

The full judgment

Read the complete, verbatim text of this judgment.

Treatment recorded in citing cases followed in 27 · applied in 2 Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions — always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

On a second appeal in a capital case under section 6(1) of the Judicature Statute 1996, the Supreme Court does not re-evaluate the evidence as a first appellate court would; its task is to decide whether the Court of Appeal applied or failed to apply the correct principles of first-appellate review. The brevity of an appellate judgment is not proof that it failed to re-evaluate the evidence. Where competent evidence supports concurrent findings of fact by the courts below, the second appellate court cannot examine the sufficiency of that evidence and may interfere only where there was no evidence to support a finding. The Court of Appeal had adequately re-evaluated the evidence; the appeal was dismissed.

Facts

The appellant believed that the deceased, his late father's brother, and the deceased's wife had bewitched him. In October 1992 he separately declared to several witnesses his intention to kill the deceased and others with a panga; the deceased was warned but did not take the threats seriously. On the night of 23 October 1992 the appellant, armed with a panga and a torch, entered the deceased's home and cut the deceased once on the neck. The deceased's wife, present in the room, recognised the appellant by the torchlight, having known him for years. The deceased seized the panga and struggled with the appellant, who abandoned the weapon and fled. As he was cut, the deceased named the appellant as his attacker, and on raising the alarm repeated to those who answered that his own relative had attacked him. The deceased died the same day. The appellant denied the killing, the threats and ownership of the panga and torch, and his alibi that he had never been to the village was rejected.

Issues

  1. Whether the Court of Appeal, as the first appellate court, failed in its duty to review, scrutinise and re-evaluate the evidence of the trial court before confirming the conviction.
  2. Whether, on a second appeal, the Supreme Court is required to re-evaluate the evidence as a first appellate court would.

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed.

Key headnotes

Appeals — Second appeal — Scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
On a second appeal the Supreme Court does not re-evaluate the evidence as a first appellate court does; except in the clearest of cases (and save in constitutional matters) it decides only whether the first appellate court applied or failed to apply the correct principles of appellate review.
Appeals — First appellate court — Duty to re-evaluate evidence
A first appellate court has a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence as a whole and reach its own conclusion, while giving due weight to the trial judge's advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses on matters of demeanour and credibility.
Appeals — Form and length of appellate judgment
The brevity of an appellate judgment is not, of itself, evidence that the court failed to make a critical evaluation of the evidence; a first appellate court need not write its judgment in the form appropriate to a court of first instance.
Appeals — Concurrent findings of fact
Where there is competent evidence supporting concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the first appellate court, the second appellate court cannot go into the sufficiency of that evidence or the reasonableness of the finding; it may interfere only where there was no evidence to support the finding, which is a question of law.
Identification — Single identifying witness
A conviction may properly rest on the evidence of a single identifying witness where the conditions favoured correct identification, such as prior knowledge of the accused over a period of years and adequate light at the scene.
Corroboration — Dying declaration and previous threats to kill
A dying declaration and circumstantial evidence of previous threats by the accused to kill the deceased may corroborate the evidence of an identifying witness; evidence of previous threats shows an expression of intention that goes beyond mere motive and tends to connect the accused with the killing.

Legislation cited (7)

  • Judicature Statute 1996 s.6(1)
  • Trial on Indictments Decree 1971 s.137
  • Trial on Indictments Decree 1971 s.131(1)
  • Criminal Procedure Act s.331(1)
  • Constitution of Uganda Article 22(1)
  • Rules of the Court of Appeal 1996 Rule 29 (Legal Notice No. 11 of 1996)
  • Supreme Court Rules Rule 29

Cases cited (10)

  • Pandya v R (1957) E.A. 336
  • S.M. Ruwala v R (1957) E.A. 570
  • Okeno v Republic (1972) E.A. 32
  • Charles B. Bitwire v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1985)
  • Kairu v Uganda (1978) H.C.B. 123
  • Okecha s/o Olilia v R (1940) 7 E.A.C.A. 74
  • Waibi and Another v Uganda (1968) E.A. 228
  • R. Mohamed Ali Hasham v R (1941) 8 E.A.C.A. 93
  • R v Hassan bin Said (1942) 9 E.A.C.A. 62
  • Uganda v Kabali (1975) E.A. 185
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.