Bank Of Uganda v Transroad Limited (Civil Appeal 3 of 1997)

Supreme Court · [1998] UGSC 7 · 1998 Appeal Allowed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download

Jurisdiction

Uganda

Case Type

Second civil appeal from a Court of Appeal decision confirming the High Court's grant of leave to register a United Kingdom judgment under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act

Decision

Appeal allowed; application to register the United Kingdom judgment in Uganda dismissed

The full judgment

Read the complete, verbatim text of this judgment.

Cited — treatment unverified cited in 2 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions — always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant did not submit to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom court and that the ex parte UK judgment was therefore not registrable in Uganda under section 3(2)(b) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act. Appearing in a foreign court solely to protest jurisdiction, or to protect assets already seized under a Garnishee Order Nisi, is not voluntary submission. Consenting to dismissal of a jurisdictional application after ex parte judgment, and conducting out-of-court settlement negotiations, do not amount to submission. The courts below misdirected themselves by treating these steps, and the appellant's contractual obligations, as submission to jurisdiction.

Facts

By a 1985 agreement made in the United Kingdom, the respondent UK company arranged shipment of railway wagons and spares for the Government of Uganda, payment to be made by promissory notes endorsed by the appellant, Bank of Uganda. The notes were only partially honoured. The respondent sued the appellant in the United Kingdom; the appellant, though served, did not appear and ex parte judgment was entered for over US$5.5 million in 1990. The respondent then obtained a Garnishee Order Nisi attaching the appellant's funds held with ANZ Banking Group in England. The appellant applied to set aside the judgment on the ground of immunity under the UK State Immunity Act 1978. A consent order in 1991 dismissed that application with costs and discharged the Garnishee Order Nisi. The respondent later obtained leave in the High Court of Uganda to register the UK judgment under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, which the Court of Appeal confirmed.

Issues

Whether the appellant, not carrying on business or ordinarily resident within the United Kingdom, voluntarily appeared or otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom court within the meaning of section 3(2)(b) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.
Whether consenting to the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte judgment, brought solely on jurisdictional grounds, amounts to submission to the foreign court's jurisdiction.
Whether appearing to obtain discharge of a Garnishee Order Nisi attaching the appellant's funds amounts to submission to jurisdiction.
Whether out-of-court negotiations and offers to settle the debt amount to submission to the foreign court's jurisdiction.
Whether the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in this matter arises under section 74 of the Civil Procedure Act or under the Judicature Statute 1996.

Orders

Appeal allowed.
Judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal set aside.
A judgment substituted in favour of the appellant dismissing the application for registration of the United Kingdom judgment.
Costs of the application awarded to the appellant here and in the courts below.
Two-thirds of the costs of the appeal in the Supreme Court awarded to the appellant, the balance withheld as a penalty for argumentative grounds in the memorandum of appeal.

Key headnotes

Civil Procedure — Enforcement of Foreign Judgments — Submission to Jurisdiction — Appearance Solely to Protest Jurisdiction

A defendant who appears in a foreign court for the sole object of protesting that the court has no jurisdiction does not thereby voluntarily appear or otherwise submit to that court's jurisdiction within the meaning of section 3(2)(b) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

Civil Procedure — Enforcement of Foreign Judgments — Consent to Dismissal of Jurisdictional Application

Consenting to the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte judgment, where that application was brought solely on jurisdictional grounds and judgment had already been entered, does not amount to submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court; it merely leaves the existing ex parte judgment on record.

Civil Procedure — Enforcement of Foreign Judgments — Appearance to Protect Assets Already Seized

An appearance in a foreign court to release or protect the defendant's property after it has already been seized by that court, including funds frozen under a Garnishee Order Nisi, is not a voluntary appearance and does not constitute submission to jurisdiction.

Civil Procedure — Enforcement of Foreign Judgments — Out-of-Court Negotiations

Negotiations between the parties and offers to settle a liability conducted outside the foreign court do not amount to submission to that court's jurisdiction, since the court has no authority over such negotiations unless they are embodied in an order of the court.

Statutory Interpretation — Jurisdiction — Distinction Between Jurisdiction Over the Merits and Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction

A party who invites a court to decide whether it has jurisdiction submits only to the jurisdiction to determine that question, not to the jurisdiction to decide the merits of the substantive claim; conflating the two is an error of law.

Statutory Interpretation — Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act s.3(2)(b) — Meaning of Voluntary Appearance

Under section 3(2)(b) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, voluntary appearance is a mode of submitting to jurisdiction rather than an act distinct from it; an appearance qualifies only where it amounts to surrendering to the court's authority and agreeing to obey its judgment in the suit.

Legislation cited (12)

Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (Cap. 47) s.3
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (Cap. 47) s.3(1)
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (Cap. 47) s.3(2)(a)
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (Cap. 47) s.3(2)(b)
Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 65) s.74
Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 65) s.75
Judicature Statute 1996 s.7(1)
Judicature Statute 1996 s.8
Judicature Statute 1996 s.14
State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) s.13
State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) s.14(4)
Constitution of Uganda Article 126(2)(e)

Cases cited (9)

Harris v Taylor (1915) 2 KB 581
In re Dulles' Settlement (No. 2); Dulles v Vidler (1951) 1 Ch 842
Henry v Geoprosco International Ltd (1976) 1 QB 726
Williams & Glyn's Bank plc v Astro Dinamico Compania Naviera SA (1984) 1 WLR 438
Wilkinson v Barking Corporation (1948) 1 KB 721
De Clermont Vs. Douner (1994) 3 KB 145
Schibsby v Westenholz
Tallack Vs. Tallack
Ephraim Ongom Odongo and Another v Francis Benega (Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1987)

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