Wakilii

Namuddu Christine v Uganda (Criminal Application 3 of 1999)

Supreme Court · [2001] UGSC 2 · 2001 Application Allowed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal, following the Court of Appeal's refusal of a certificate to appeal.
Decision
Application for leave to appeal allowed; applicant held entitled to a review of the case by the Supreme Court.

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Cited — treatment unverified cited in 3 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

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Holding

On an application for leave to appeal under section 6(5) of the Judicature Statute 1996 and Rule 37(1)(b), the Supreme Court is not restricted, as the Court of Appeal is, to questions of law of great public or general importance; in its overall duty to see that justice is done it may grant leave whenever it considers the appeal should be heard, and is not confined to the matters considered by the Court of Appeal. While the applicant's arguments on strict liability had been properly dealt with below, the Court found she appeared to have been convicted and sentenced on two counts arising from the same transaction, contrary to section 20 of the Penal Code and section 39 of the Interpretation Decree 1976, and allowed the application so the case could be reviewed.

Facts

The applicant was Under Secretary, and Professor Ssenyonga the Permanent Secretary, in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. Arising from the performance of their duties, the two were jointly charged before a Chief Magistrate with causing financial loss contrary to section 258(1) of the Penal Code and abuse of office contrary to section 83, both counts based on the same transactions between June 1992 and July 1993 involving the signing of Bank of Uganda cheques amounting to Shs.89,036,431. They were each sentenced to concurrent terms of five years and three years and ordered to pay Shs.20 million compensation. Their appeal succeeded in the High Court, but the Court of Appeal reversed and restored the Chief Magistrate's decision. After their appeal to the Supreme Court was found to lack the requisite certificate or leave, the Court of Appeal declined to certify the matter, prompting the present application for leave. Professor Ssenyonga did not pursue the application.

Issues

  1. Whether, on an application for leave to appeal under section 6(5) of the Judicature Statute 1996 and Rule 37(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Rules, the Supreme Court is confined to questions of law or to the matters considered by the Court of Appeal when it refused a certificate.
  2. Whether the applicant's intended appeal raised matters of public or general importance warranting the grant of leave.
  3. Whether the applicant could properly be convicted and sentenced on two counts arising from the same transaction without offending the rule against double punishment.

Orders

  • Application allowed.

Key headnotes

Criminal Procedure — Third Appeal to Supreme Court — Leave to Appeal Under Section 6(5) Judicature Statute
On an application for leave to appeal under section 6(5) of the Judicature Statute 1996 and Rule 37(1)(b), the Supreme Court is not restricted to questions of law of great public or general importance as the Court of Appeal is when considering a certificate; in its overall duty to see that justice is done it may grant leave whenever it considers the appeal should be heard.
Criminal Procedure — Leave to Appeal — Scope of Supreme Court's Consideration
When the Supreme Court considers an application for leave to appeal after the Court of Appeal has refused a certificate, it is not confined to the matters considered by the Court of Appeal but may take into account anything relevant to doing justice in the case.
Criminal Law — Double Punishment — Offences Arising From the Same Act or Transaction
Where the facts of a case disclose one act and no more, an accused cannot be convicted and punished twice for that act under different enactments, by virtue of section 20 of the Penal Code and section 39 of the Interpretation Decree 1976.

Legislation cited (8)

  • Judicature Statute 1996 s.6(5)
  • Supreme Court Rules 1996 r.37(1)(b)
  • Supreme Court Rules 1996 r.41(1)
  • Supreme Court Rules 1996 r.42(1)
  • Penal Code Act s.258(1)
  • Penal Code Act s.83
  • Penal Code Act s.20
  • Interpretation Decree 1976 s.39

Cases cited (10)

  • Kassim Mpanga v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1994)
  • Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher (1963) A.C. 349
  • Gelberg v Miller (1961) 1 All E.R. 291
  • Rex v Mohamed Shah s/o Lal Shah (1939) 6 EACA 103
  • R v Dames; R v Williams (1961) 1 All ER 290
  • Ashdon v R (1973) 58 Cr. App. R. 339
  • Verrier v DPP (1966) 50 Cr. App. R. 315
  • R v Dobbs (1951) 18 EACA 319
  • Santokh Singh Kehar v R (1955) 22 EACA 440
  • Muiruri v Republic (1973) EA 86
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.