Wakilii

Twinomugisha Alex alias Twine and Ors v Uganda [2003] UGSC 20

Supreme Court · 2003 Appeal Dismissed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Second criminal appeal from the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed appeals against High Court convictions for murder and sentences of death
Decision
Convictions and sentences of death of all three appellants for the murders of Prince Charles Kijanangoma and Stephen Kaganda confirmed; appeals dismissed

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Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of all three appellants. A1's confession was voluntary and true; the recording officers' failure to countersign was an irregularity cured by the final signature and not fatal. A1 was properly identified at the scene and at the parade, corroborating the confession. Nkoba and Mwesige, who acted on their employer's orders without knowing they were assisting killers, were not accomplices. The deceased's statement that A3 had hired killers was admissible as a dying declaration under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act. The cumulative circumstantial evidence was incompatible with the innocence of A2 and A3 and proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

A3, Prime Minister and a Regent of Toro Kingdom, was in conflict with members of the royal family led by Prince Charles Kijanangoma, who sought his removal. On 23/3/99 the Prince warned associates that A3 had hired killers and paid money to finish him off. On 25/3/99 at Palace View Bar in Fort Portal, A1 shot Prince Kijanangoma dead and his companion shot dead the bar's nightwatchman, Stephen Kaganda; an eyewitness, PW7, was wounded and later identified A1. A1 confessed that A2 had hired him to kill the Prince for an agreed fee plus fuel money, and that the killers sheltered at A3's Rwenkuba farm afterwards. Circumstantial evidence showed A3 directing the release of a company vehicle, money and fuel to A2, sheltering the killers, and later disguising and disappearing the vehicle linked to the murder, and instructing that two witnesses be made to disappear. A1, A2 and A3 were convicted; co-accused were acquitted; the Court of Appeal dismissed their appeals.

Issues

  1. Whether the charge and caution statement of A1 was voluntary, true, and properly recorded, and whether failure of the recording officers to countersign rendered it inadmissible.
  2. Whether A1 was properly identified as the gunman both at the scene of the crime and at the identification parade.
  3. Whether A1's defence of alibi was properly rejected.
  4. Whether the prosecution witnesses Nkoba (PW15) and Mwesige were accomplices whose evidence required corroboration.
  5. Whether the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proved the guilt of A2 and A3 beyond reasonable doubt.
  6. Whether the deceased's statement that A3 had hired killers was admissible as a dying declaration under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act.

Orders

  • The appeals by all three appellants are dismissed.

Key headnotes

Criminal Evidence — Confessions — Charge and Caution Statement — Failure of Recording Officers to Countersign
An irregularity in recording a charge and caution statement, such as the recording officers' failure to countersign after the suspect's signature, is cured by the recording officer's signature at the end of the statement and is not fatal to its admissibility where no miscarriage of justice results.
Criminal Evidence — Confessions — Repudiated Confession — Corroboration and Verification of Truthfulness
A court may convict on a repudiated confession where, after warning itself of the danger and being satisfied in all the circumstances that the confession is true, it finds corroboration; a confession tested against and consistent with the body of prosecution evidence may justify conviction.
Witnesses — Accomplices — Employee Acting on Employer's Lawful Orders Without Knowledge of Crime
A person who does acts on the orders of an employer, such as providing money, fuel and services to others, is not an accomplice where there is no evidence that he knew at the time that he was assisting persons engaged in crime; an employee obeying a master's apparently lawful order does not thereby become an accomplice.
Criminal Evidence — Dying Declarations — Admissibility under Section 30(a) of the Evidence Act
A statement by a deceased person as to the cause of, or the circumstances resulting in, his death is admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act where the cause of death comes into question, whether or not the maker was under expectation of death, provided it relates directly to the occasion of death and is not a mere general expression of fear or suspicion.
Criminal Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Standard for Conviction
In a case depending exclusively on circumstantial evidence, the court must be satisfied that the inculpatory facts are incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt, and that there are no other co-existing circumstances weakening or destroying the inference of guilt; individually inconclusive incidents may, taken cumulatively, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Evidence — Confession of a Co-Accused — Use Against Other Accused
The confession of a co-accused cannot found a conviction of another accused by itself but may lend credence to and corroborate other independent evidence connecting that accused to the crime.
Criminal Procedure — Evaluation of Evidence — Duty to Weigh Defence Against Prosecution Case
The evidence of the prosecution must be weighed against that of the defence, with the burden of proof always resting on the prosecution, and no final decision taken until all the evidence is considered to determine whether the defence has raised a reasonable doubt; a failure to fully consider the defence does not occasion injustice where the prosecution evidence is overwhelming.

Legislation cited (2)

  • Evidence Act s.30(a)
  • Trial on Indictments Decree s.81(1)

Cases cited (19)

  • Asenua and Another v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1998)
  • Ssesanga Stephen v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 2000)
  • Davies v DPP (1954) AC 378
  • Nassolo Hadija v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2000)
  • Canisio s/o Walya v R [1956] 23 EACA 453
  • R v Kabateleine s/o Nchwamba (1946) 13 EACA 164
  • Pandya v R [1957] EA 336
  • Ruwala v R [1957] EA 570
  • Bogere Moses and Another v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1997)
  • Alfred Tajar v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 1969)
  • Sarapio Tinkamalirwe v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 1989)
  • Henry Kifamunte v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997)
  • Simon Musoke v R [1958] EA 775
  • Teper v R [1952] AC 480
  • R v Erunasani Sekono and Another (1947) 14 EACA 74
  • Abdu Ngobi v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1991)
  • Suleiman Katusabe v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1991)
  • Justine Nankya v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1995)
  • Godfrey Tinkamalirwe v Uganda [1988-1990] HCB 5
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.