Nuru Kaaya v Crescent Transportation Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2002)
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Holding
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Having agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge's refusal of a short adjournment and entry of judgment without addressing the merits were injudicious exercises of discretion fatal to the trial, the Court held that the proper course was to remit the case for continuation, not to evaluate one-sided evidence and dismiss the suit. Because the defendant had not deliberately declined to give evidence and the trial had aborted through the court's fault, a final judgment on the plaintiff's evidence alone would breach the right to a fair hearing under Article 28(1). Both lower judgments were set aside and the matter remitted to the trial judge to hear the defence case.
Facts
The appellant imported goods from Indonesia, valued at US$33,396, which arrived by sea at Mombasa. She contracted the respondent to transport a container of the goods by road from Mombasa to Kampala. The respondent delivered the container in Kampala, where the appellant signed a delivery note. When the seal was broken in the presence of Uganda Revenue Authority officials, the appellant found fewer bales and gunny bags than she had imported, and a police inspection suggested the container had been tampered with. She sued the respondent in the High Court for special damages, general damages and costs. The contract of carriage was admitted; the respondent contended it had delivered all the goods received at Mombasa. After the plaintiff closed her case, the respondent's counsel sought an adjournment of one day to call the defence; the trial judge refused, invoked Order 75 rule 4 and entered judgment for the plaintiff as prayed.
Issues
- Whether the Court of Appeal, having found that the trial judge injudiciously refused an adjournment and injudiciously entered judgment, should have ordered a retrial rather than evaluating the evidence and dismissing the suit.
- Whether an objection to the formulation of grounds of appeal as argumentative and narrative required leave under rule 97(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
Orders
- Appeal allowed.
- Judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal set aside.
- Case remitted to the trial judge (or his successor) to continue the hearing from where it stopped, namely hearing the defence case.
- Each party to bear its own costs in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.
- Costs in the High Court to abide the conclusion of the trial.
Key headnotes
Legislation cited (6)
- Civil Procedure Rules O.75 r.4
- Court of Appeal Rules r.29
- Judicature Statute 1996 s.12
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.81(1)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.97(b)
- Constitution of Uganda art.28(1)
Cases cited (7)
- R.M. Khemaney v L. Murlindhare (1960) EA 268
- Kawoga Joseph v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1999)
- Bank of Uganda v Transroad Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1997)
- Adonia Nekudi v C.K. Mukasa (Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1986)
- Famous Cycle Agencies v M.R. Karia (Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1994)
- Habib v Rajput (1960) EA 92
- Shalib case (supra)