Wakilii

Mureeba Janet & 2 Ors v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 13 of 2003)

Supreme Court · [2006] UGSC 24 · 2006 Appeal Dismissed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Second criminal appeal from the Court of Appeal's dismissal of an appeal against High Court convictions for murder
Decision
Appeal dismissed; convictions and death sentences confirmed (appeal against sentence reserved and still pending).

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Treatment recorded in citing cases followed in 4 · applied in 1 Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions — always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the second appeal against murder convictions resting on circumstantial evidence. It held that on a second appeal it would not re-evaluate evidence afresh absent exceptional circumstances, and there were two concurrent findings that the prosecution evidence was reliable. The deceased's repeated reports of the first appellant's threats were admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act as statements about the circumstances of the transaction resulting in her death. The circumstantial evidence — the threats, the first appellant's conduct after the killings, and the second and third appellants' acquisition of a vehicle and conduct before and after the shooting — pointed irresistibly to guilt, being incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.

Facts

The first deceased was the customary wife of Charles Mureeba, husband of the first appellant. Between 1997 and 1999 the first deceased repeatedly reported to neighbours, relatives and colleagues that the first appellant had threatened to kill her, causing her to relocate several times, finally to Ntinda. In late May 1999 the second and third appellants sought to hire a self-drive vehicle from a mechanic (PW5), telling him a rich woman had hired them to kill a woman in Ntinda. On 6 June 1999 they brought a white double-cabin pick-up to the garage; PW5 saw a gun and overcoat inside, and they borrowed a tool used to remove number plates. That evening a witness near the deceased's home saw the same pick-up, heard gunshots, and saw a man matching the second appellant flee to the vehicle, which had no number plates. The first deceased and her young daughter were found shot dead. The first appellant returned home and rejoiced with others over the killing. The convictions rested wholly on circumstantial evidence.

Issues

  1. Whether the circumstantial evidence on record pointed irresistibly to the guilt of the appellants so as to sustain their convictions for murder.
  2. Whether the first appellant procured the second and third appellants to kill the deceased and shared a common intention with them.
  3. Whether the deceased's reports of the first appellant's threats, made to witnesses, were admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act as statements concerning the circumstances of the transaction resulting in her death.
  4. Whether, on a second appeal, the Supreme Court was required to re-evaluate the whole of the evidence afresh.

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed.

Key headnotes

Appeals — Second Appeal — Limits on Re-evaluation of Evidence
On a second appeal, the Supreme Court is not required to re-evaluate the evidence as a first appellate court does, except in exceptional cases, particularly where there are concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below.
Circumstantial Evidence — Standard for Conviction
For circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the inculpatory facts must point irresistibly to the guilt of the accused, being incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.
Circumstantial Evidence — Cumulative Assessment
Circumstantial evidence concerns the cumulative effect of the totality of the evidence; the different pieces of evidence should be assessed together rather than in isolation from one another.
Statements by Deceased Persons — Circumstances of the Transaction — Evidence Act s.30(a)
A deceased's statements about threats to her life are admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act as statements concerning the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death, regardless of whether the deceased was under expectation of death when the statements were made.
Corroboration — Former Statement of Witness — Evidence Act s.155
Under section 155 of the Evidence Act, a witness's former statement relating to the same fact, made at or about the time the fact occurred or before an authority legally competent to investigate it, may be proved to corroborate the witness's testimony.
Police Statements — Proof and Admission
A police statement cannot be treated as evidence or acted upon by a court unless it is properly proved and admitted, and a witness's oral testimony cannot be preferred over a police statement that was never properly admitted in evidence.

Legislation cited (2)

  • Evidence Act s.30(a)
  • Evidence Act s.155

Cases cited (7)

  • Kifamunte Henry v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997)
  • Bogere Moses & Another Vs Uganda, (Supreme Court of Uganda certified Criminal Judgments 1996/2000) at page 185
  • Bogere Charles Vs Uganda (Supreme Court of Uganda Certified Criminal Judgement 1996/2000) at page 213
  • R v Kipkering Arap Koske and Another (1949) 16 EACA 135
  • Simon Musoke v R (1958) EA 715
  • Ojede s/o Odyek v R (1964) EA 499
  • Susan Kigula & 417 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2003)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.