Mureeba and Others v Uganda [2006] UGSC 7

Supreme Court · 2006 Appeal Dismissed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download

Jurisdiction

Uganda

Case Type

Second criminal appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal's dismissal of an appeal against a High Court conviction for murder

Decision

Appeal dismissed; convictions and death sentences of the three appellants upheld

The full judgment

Read the complete, verbatim text of this judgment.

Cited — treatment unverified cited in 1 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions — always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed a second appeal against convictions for murder founded entirely on circumstantial evidence. It reaffirmed that on a second appeal the Court will not re-evaluate evidence afresh save in exceptional cases, and found this was not such a case given the two concurrent findings of fact below. The circumstantial evidence pointed irresistibly to the guilt of each appellant and was incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. The deceased's reports of the first appellant's threats were admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act as statements concerning the circumstances of the transaction resulting in her death. Common intention among the three appellants was established. The appeal was dismissed and the convictions upheld.

Facts

The three appellants were convicted of the murder of Namara Norah (a customary wife of Charles Mureeba, husband of the first appellant) and her child. The prosecution case was wholly circumstantial. Over several years the deceased repeatedly reported to friends, relatives and colleagues that the first appellant had threatened to kill her, causing her to relocate residences several times. Shortly before the murder, the second and third appellants sought to hire a self-drive vehicle, the second appellant telling a mechanic (PW5) that a rich woman had hired him to kill a woman in Ntinda. On the day of the killing PW5 saw the two appellants with a gun in a pick-up, and a witness near the scene (PW2) saw a matching white double-cabin pick-up and a man resembling the second appellant flee after gunshots. After the murder the first appellant was seen rejoicing and later hosted a witchdoctor who performed a ritual. The trial court convicted on this evidence; the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Issues

Whether the circumstantial evidence on record pointed irresistibly to the guilt of the appellants and was sufficient to sustain the convictions for murder.
Whether the prosecution established a common intention among the three appellants to murder the deceased persons.
Whether the deceased's reports of the first appellant's threats, made to PW1, PW3, PW4 and PW8, were admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act.
Whether, on a second appeal, the Supreme Court was required to re-evaluate the evidence afresh.
Whether the defence of alibi raised by the first and second appellants was adequately considered.

Orders

Appeal dismissed.

Key headnotes

Criminal Procedure — Second Appeal — Limits on Re-evaluation of Evidence

On a second appeal, except in exceptional cases, the Supreme Court is not required to re-evaluate the evidence as a first appellate court does, particularly where there are two concurrent findings of fact by the courts below.

Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Test for Conviction

For circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction it must point irresistibly to the guilt of the accused; the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.

Evidence — Statements by Deceased Persons — Section 30(a) Evidence Act

Statements by a deceased person concerning the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death are admissible under section 30(a) of the Evidence Act, whether or not the maker was under expectation of death; the deceased's reports of the accused's threats to her life form part of such circumstances and are admissible.

Evidence — Corroboration — Former Statements under Section 155 Evidence Act

Under section 155 of the Evidence Act a former statement made by a witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time the fact took place or before an authority legally competent to investigate it, may be proved to corroborate the witness's testimony.

Evidence — Police Statements — Requirement of Proof and Admission

A police statement cannot be treated as evidence or acted upon by a court unless it is properly proved and admitted, save where its authenticity is not challenged; an unproved statement cannot be relied upon to find a witness's oral testimony more preferable or weightier.

Criminal Law — Common Intention — Proof by Circumstantial Evidence

Common intention to commit murder may be inferred from the cumulative effect of the totality of the circumstantial evidence, which must be assessed as a whole rather than in isolated pieces, including conduct showing two or more persons working for a common purpose.

Legislation cited (2)

Evidence Act s.30(a)
Evidence Act s.155

Cases cited (7)

Kifamunte Henry v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997)
Bogere Moses & Another Vs Uganda, (Supreme Court of Uganda certified Criminal Judgments 1996/2000) at page 185
Bogere Charles Vs Uganda (Supreme Court of Uganda Certified Criminal Judgement 1996/2000) at page 213
R v Kipkering Arap Koske and Another (1949) 16 EACA 135
Simon Musoke v R (1958) EA 715
Ojede s/o Odyek v R (1964) EA 499
Suzan Kigali and 417 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2003)

Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.