Attorney General v Kamoga & Another (Civil Application 2 of 2008)

Supreme Court · [2009] UGSC 35 · 2009 Application Allowed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download

Jurisdiction

Uganda

Case Type

Reference to a single Judge of the Supreme Court under rule 106 of the Rules of the Court from a decision of the taxing officer on a bill of costs

Decision

Reference allowed; instructions fee reduced to Shs. 17,500,000 and total taxed costs reduced to Shs. 17,918,500

The full judgment

Read the complete, verbatim text of this judgment.

Cited — treatment unverified cited in 3 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions — always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

On a reference from a taxing officer, the Supreme Court (single judge) held that the value of the subject matter constitutes "the amount involved in the appeal" only when it is an issue for determination in the appeal. The value of the suit land was not such an issue, so the taxing officer misdirected herself by relying on a valuation report to fix the instructions fee. The Shs. 70,000,000 fee was manifestly excessive, indicating application of a wrong principle, and was reduced to Shs. 17,500,000, with total costs reduced to Shs. 17,918,500.

Facts

The respondents sued the Attorney General and others over freehold land at Mbuya Hill, Kampala. A consent judgment in the respondents' favour was set aside by the High Court but restored by the Court of Appeal; the Attorney General's appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed with costs to the respondents in all three courts. The respondents' bill of costs was taxed by the Registrar (taxing officer) at Shs. 70,418,500, of which Shs. 70,000,000 was allowed as the instructions fee for defending the appeal. In assessing that fee, the taxing officer relied on a valuation report putting the value of the suit land at Shs. 1,293,000,000 as part of the importance and value of the subject matter. The Attorney General referred only the instructions fee to a single judge, contending it was manifestly excessive and based on a valuation report not part of the appeal record.

Issues

What constitutes "the amount involved in the appeal" for the purpose of assessing an instructions fee under paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule to the Rules of the Court.
Whether the taxing officer erred in principle by taking into account the value of the suit land stated in a valuation report that was not part of the appeal record.
Whether the instructions fee of Shs. 70,000,000 was so manifestly excessive as to justify interference on a reference.

Orders

Application allowed.
Instructions fee reduced from Shs. 70,000,000 to Shs. 17,500,000.
Total costs reduced from Shs. 70,418,500 to Shs. 17,918,500.
Costs of the reference, set at Shs. 3,000,000, awarded to the applicant.

Key headnotes

Costs — Taxation — Instructions fee — Meaning of "the amount involved in the appeal"

The value of the subject matter of a suit, or the sole damages awarded, constitutes "the amount involved in the appeal" under paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule to the Rules of the Court only where that value was itself an issue or question to be determined in the appeal.

Costs — Taxation — Review of taxation — When a judge will interfere with quantum

On a reference the decision of the taxing officer on quantum is conclusive and a judge will interfere only in exceptional cases where a wrong principle was applied; application of a wrong principle may be inferred from an award that is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate, and interference is justified only where the error substantially affected the quantum and upholding it would cause injustice.

Costs — Taxation — Instructions fee — Public interest balance

In assessing an instructions fee a taxing officer must balance fair reimbursement of the successful litigant against the public duty to keep costs at a reasonable level so as not to restrict access to court to the wealthy, while maintaining a level of remuneration sufficient to attract worthy recruits to the profession, with consistency in awards maintained as far as possible.

Costs — Taxation — Error of principle — Manifestly excessive award

Where a taxing officer is significantly influenced by an irrelevant factor and arrives at an award so manifestly excessive that no reasonably competent advocate would demand it, the judge on a reference may infer an error of principle, set aside the award and substitute a fair and reasonable figure.

Legislation cited (7)

Rules of the Supreme Court r.106(1)
Rules of the Supreme Court r.106(3)
Rules of the Supreme Court Third Schedule para.9(2)
Rules of the Supreme Court Third Schedule para.9(3)
Civil Procedure Act s.82
Civil Procedure Act s.98
Civil Procedure Rules O.46 r.2

Cases cited (4)

Premchand Raichand v Quarry Services (1972) EA 192
Attorney General v Uganda Blanket Manufacturers (1973) Ltd (Civil Application No. 17 of 1993)
Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 33 of 1999)
Alexander Okello v Kayondo & Co. Advocates (Civil Application No. 1 of 1997)

Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.