Wakilii

Lubowa and others v Makerere University (Civil Appeal 2 of 2011)

Supreme Court · [2013] UGSC 24 · 2013 Appeal Allowed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Second civil appeal from the Court of Appeal, arising from the High Court's dismissal of the suit on a preliminary objection that it was time-barred under the Limitation Act.
Decision
Appeal allowed; preliminary objection rejected and the suit remitted to the High Court for determination on the merits.

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Cited — treatment unverified cited in 4 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

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Holding

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Determining when a cause of action accrues requires that all material facts entitling the plaintiff to succeed be present. Here the parties were jointly studying the proper equivalence of the appellants' salary scales, and the respondent advised them to wait for the studies; until the University Council made its final decision in 2001 the material facts were not all present. The cause of action therefore arose in 2001, not 1983, so the suit filed in 2004 was within the six-year limitation period and not time-barred. The Court observed obiter that, on a purposive reading, a party's conduct or representations may preclude it from relying on a limitation defence.

Facts

The appellants were Chief Technicians employed by the respondent university. Under a 1976 scheme they were on the U2 scale. A 1983 circular introduced new M-scales and placed the appellants on M9, which they protested as a demotion. The respondent abolished M9 and moved them to M7 and then M6. A committee (the Rwendeire Report) recommended in 1992 that they be placed on M5, and in 1994 the Vice Chancellor informed their representatives that a decision had been made to place them on M5, with formal communication to follow. The respondent advised the appellants to wait while it commissioned further job-evaluation and restructuring studies. The University Council, the supreme decision-making authority, did not make its final decision until 2001, when it confirmed M6 and rejected the M5 recommendation. The appellants filed suit on 30 April 2004. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, contending the cause of action arose with the 1983 circular.

Issues

  1. Whether the appellants' suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, which turned on when the cause of action accrued.
  2. Whether a party may, by its conduct or representations, waive or be estopped from pleading the defence of limitation under the Limitation Act.

Orders

  • Appeal allowed.
  • Decision of the Court of Appeal and High Court on the preliminary point set aside.
  • Suit remitted to the High Court to determine the substantive issue of whether the appellants should be placed on the M5 salary scale.
  • Costs to the appellants in this Court and the Courts below.

Key headnotes

Limitation — Accrual of Cause of Action — When All Material Facts Are Present
A cause of action accrues, and time under the Limitation Act begins to run, only when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and all the facts material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed are present.
Limitation — Cause of Action — Determination from the Pleadings and Surrounding Circumstances
In determining when a cause of action arose the court must consider the pleadings in their entirety together with all the facts and peculiar circumstances of the case, rather than fixing on a single event.
Limitation — Effect of Pending Studies and Continuing Indecision on Accrual
Where the parties are still scientifically determining the facts underlying a claim and no final decision has been made by the responsible authority, the material facts necessary to constitute a cause of action are not yet present, and limitation does not begin to run until the final decision is made.
Limitation Act — Purposive Approach — Waiver of Limitation Defence by Conduct or Representation
On a purposive approach to a statute of limitation, a procedural protection conferred on a party may be treated as subject to an implied exception that it can be waived; a party's conduct or representations inducing the other to delay proceedings may preclude it from later raising the defence of time-bar.

Legislation cited (3)

  • Limitation Act (Cap. 80) s.3(1)(a)
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order 7 Rule 2
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order 7 Rules 6 and 11

Cases cited (6)

  • Gillette v Tucker, 65 N.E. 865 (Ohio 1902)
  • Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd (1970) 2 All E.R. 871 (HL)
  • National Insurance Corporation v Span International Ltd [1997-2001] UCLR 100
  • Glencar Exploration v Mayo County Council [2002] I.R. 84
  • Eridad Otabong v Attorney General (Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1990) (1991) ULSLR 150
  • Iga case (supra) — Kanyeihamba, JSC
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.