Wakilii

Lubowa & 4 Ors v Makerere University [2013] UGSC 8

Supreme Court · 2013 Appeal Allowed ✦ AI-generated summary ↓ Download
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Second appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal on a preliminary objection that a civil suit for breach of contract was time-barred under the Limitation Act.
Decision
Appeal allowed; preliminary objection on limitation rejected; suit remitted to the High Court for determination on the merits.

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Cited — treatment unverified cited in 1 (treatment unverified) Derived from citing cases in the Wakilii corpus — not an assertion that this case is good law.

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Holding

The Court considered when a cause of action accrues for limitation purposes where an employer kept staff awaiting the outcome of successive professional studies into the correct equivalence of their salary scales. It held that all the material facts necessary to constitute a cause of action were not present until the University Council made its final decision in 2001, not when the disputed 1983 circular issued. The employees' suit, filed in 2004, was therefore not time-barred under the Limitation Act. The appeal was allowed, the decisions of the Court of Appeal and High Court set aside, and the suit remitted to the High Court for determination on the merits, with costs.

Facts

The appellants were Chief Technicians employed by Makerere University. Under a 1976 salary review they were placed on the U2 scale. In 1983, General Circular No. 631 introduced the University's own M salary scales (M1–M9), and a conversion exercise placed the appellants on M9. The appellants protested. The University abolished M9 and moved them first to M7 and then M6. A study committee chaired by Dr Rwendeire recommended in 1992 that M9 be abolished and the affected staff placed on M5. In 1994 the Vice Chancellor informed the appellants that a decision had been made to place them on M5, with formal communication and implementation to follow. This was never done; the appellants were repeatedly advised to await further restructuring and job-evaluation exercises. The University Council did not make a final decision until 2001, when it confirmed the appellants on M6 and rejected the M5 recommendation. The appellants filed suit in the High Court in 2004 claiming salary arrears. The University raised a preliminary objection that the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, contending the cause of action accrued in 1983.

Issues

  1. Whether the appellants' suit for breach of contract was time-barred under the Limitation Act.
  2. When the appellants' cause of action accrued for the purposes of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether the respondent, by its conduct and representations, waived or was estopped from raising the defence of limitation.

Orders

  • Appeal allowed.
  • Decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court set aside.
  • Suit remitted to the High Court to determine the substantive issue of whether the appellants should be placed on the M5 salary scale.
  • Costs awarded to the appellants in the Supreme Court and the Courts below.

Key headnotes

Limitation of Actions — Accrual of Cause of Action — When All Material Facts Are Present
Apart from any special provision, a cause of action accrues when there is a person who can sue and another who can be sued and all the facts material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed are present; time under the Limitation Act runs only from that point.
Limitation of Actions — Continuing Dispute — Effect of Ongoing Studies and Absence of Final Decision
Where the parties are engaged in professional studies to scientifically determine the facts underlying a claim and the responsible organ has made no final decision, the material facts necessary to constitute a cause of action are not present, and the cause of action accrues only when that final decision is made.
Limitation Act — Purposive Construction — Waiver of a Statutory Time-Bar
A statute of limitation should be construed purposively; a procedural time requirement imposed for the benefit of one party is subject to an implied exception that it may be waived by that party where it has so conducted itself that it would not be fair to allow it to rely on the other party's non-compliance.
Estoppel — Representations Inducing Delay — Bar to Pleading Limitation
A defendant may be debarred from pleading a statute of limitation where, during negotiations, it has represented that it desires the plaintiff to delay proceedings and that the plaintiff will not be prejudiced by acting on that representation, and the plaintiff acts on it.

Legislation cited (4)

  • Limitation Act (Cap. 80) s.3(1)(a)
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order 7 Rule 2
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order 7 Rule 6
  • Civil Procedure Rules Order 7 Rule 11

Cases cited (6)

  • Gillette -Vs- Turker, 65 N.E. 865 (Ohio 1902)
  • Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1970] 2 All E.R. 871 (HL)
  • National Insurance Corporation v Span International Ltd [1997-2001] UCLR 100
  • Glencar Exploration v Mayo County Council [2002] I.R. 84
  • Eridad Otabong v Attorney General (Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1990)
  • Iga's case [supra] (per Kanyeihamba, JSC)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.