Nahabwe v Uganda (Miscellaneous Application 16 of 2020)
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Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed an application for a certificate of importance to file a third appeal. The proposed question — whether a second appellate court may accept the first appellate court's conclusions without adequately scrutinising the evidence — was held not to transcend the applicant's particular case or bear significantly on the public interest. The law governing a second appellate court's treatment of concurrent findings of fact, and the assessment of identification evidence of a single witness, is firmly settled by clear precedent, leaving no state of uncertainty requiring resolution. The applicant was found merely dissatisfied with concurrent findings of fact, which is not a proper basis for certification. The application was accordingly dismissed.
Facts
The applicant was convicted by the Chief Magistrate's Court of Buganda Road of attempted murder contrary to section 204(a) of the Penal Code Act and conspiracy to commit a felony contrary to section 390, and sentenced to concurrent terms of eight and three years' imprisonment. On first appeal the High Court upheld the convictions and added a compensation order of UGX 30,000,000. On second appeal the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and custodial sentences but quashed the compensation order. Intending a third appeal, the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for a certificate of importance, which was dismissed for want of merit. She then applied to the Supreme Court for the certificate, contending that her intended appeal raised a question of great public or general importance, namely whether a second appellate court may accept the first appellate court's conclusions without adequately scrutinising the evidence, including identification evidence of a single witness. The respondent opposed the application, arguing the question was confined to the applicant's case and was already settled by precedent.
Issues
- Whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for the grant of a certificate of importance entitling her to lodge a third appeal to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the question whether a second appellate court may merely accept the conclusions of the first appellate court without adequately scrutinising the evidence on record is a matter of great public or general importance.
Orders
- The orders and certificate sought are declined.
- The application is dismissed.
Key headnotes
Legislation cited (14)
- Judicature Act s.5(5)
- Judicature Act s.6(2)
- Penal Code Act s.204(a)
- Penal Code Act s.390
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.2(2)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.38(1)(b)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.42(1)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.42(2)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.43(1)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.50(1)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.50(2)
- Court of Appeal Rules r.32(2)
- Constitution Article 132(3)
- Constitution Article 163(4)(b)
Cases cited (11)
- Hermanus Phillipus Styen vs. Giovanni Gnecci-Ruscone, (Supreme Court Criminal Application No. 4 of 2012)
- Uganda v Damian Akankwasa (Court of Appeal Miscellaneous Application No. 58 of 2019)
- Abdullah Nabulere and Another v Uganda (Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1978)
- Bogere Moses v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1997)
- Namuddu Christine v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Application No. 3 of 1999)
- Farook Aziz (Administrator of Estate of Salma Kabasingo) v Abdalla Abdu Makuru (Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2002)
- Sophatia Beithi and 3 Others v Nangobi Jane and 2 Others (Supreme Court Civil Application No. 7 of 2015)
- Areet Sam v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 2005)
- Kifamunte Henry v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997)
- R v Hassan Bin Said (1942) 9 EACA 62
- Bogere Charles v Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1996)