Advocate v Advocates Committee (Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1955)
Observed later treatment
No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.
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Holding
The Court of Appeal held that in disciplinary proceedings involving deceit or moral turpitude, the standard of proof approximates to that required in civil fraud cases—higher than the balance of probabilities but not as high as beyond reasonable doubt. The Court's function in reviewing such proceedings is akin to confirmatory or revisional jurisdiction, making it a second appellate tribunal that will only intervene where the lower tribunals have distinctly erred. On the facts, the Court found no such error and upheld the finding that the advocate intended to mislead the court by suppressing disclosure of a prior adverse judgment. The appeal was dismissed.
Outcome
The advocate's admonishment by the Supreme Court was upheld
Facts
An advocate practising in Kenya was the subject of disciplinary proceedings following a report by the Advocates' Committee. The advocate had represented Mrs. Shantaben in deportation proceedings. After an adverse judgment by Cram J. on the merits, the advocate brought a fresh application before Hooper J. seeking similar relief on different procedural grounds. In affidavits and oral submissions before Hooper J., the advocate failed to disclose the full scope and effect of the prior adverse judgment by Cram J., though he made passing references to the existence of that case. The Advocates' Committee found that the advocate intended to deceive and mislead the court. The Supreme Court endorsed this finding, concluding the advocate had committed professional misconduct by deliberately intending to mislead Hooper J., and ordered the advocate to be admonished. The primary facts were agreed; the dispute centred on the inferences to be drawn from those facts.
Issues
- What standard of proof is required in disciplinary proceedings against an advocate for professional misconduct involving an element of deceit or moral turpitude?
- What is the function of the Court of Appeal in reviewing concurrent findings of fact by the Advocates' Committee and the Supreme Court in disciplinary proceedings?
- Whether the advocate committed professional misconduct by intending to mislead a Judge of the Supreme Court through non-disclosure of a prior adverse judgment.
- What is the correct method of intituling disciplinary proceedings under the Advocates Ordinance?
Orders
- Appeal dismissed.
- Costs awarded to the respondent.
Rules and key headnotes
Legislation cited (4)
- Advocates Ordinance 1949 s.9(3)(iii)
- Immigration Regulations reg.22(4)(b)
- Indian Evidence Act s.40
- Solicitors Acts 1932 to 1941
Cases cited (9)
- In re A Solicitor [1945] KB 368
- In re Hardwick A Solicitor (1883-4) 12 LR QB 148
- Ex parte Renner [1897] AC 218
- In re Cooke (1888-9) 5 TLR 407
- Kashyap v R (1944) 25 ILR Lah 408
- Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 AE 326
- Owners of P. Caland v. Glamorgan S.S. Co. Ltd.
- McIntyre Bros. v. McGavin
- In re a Solicitor (1)
Full judgment
The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.