Attorney General v Sekikubo & 4 Ors [2016] UGSC 5
Observed later treatment
No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.
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Holding
On a reference under Rule 109 challenging an instruction fee of UGX 250,000,000 (UGX 150,000,000 for senior counsel and UGX 100,000,000 for second counsel) awarded by the taxing officer in a constitutional appeal, the single judge held that a judge will not interfere with a taxing officer's assessment save in exceptional cases where a wrong principle was applied or the award is manifestly excessive. While the underlying appeal was of great public importance, it involved only ordinary constitutional interpretation and was not difficult or complex. The award was manifestly excessive, lacked consistency with comparable awards, and was inferred to result from an error in principle. It was substituted with UGX 80,000,000 for senior counsel and UGX 50,000,000 for second counsel.
Outcome
Reference granted; taxed instruction fee reduced from UGX 250,000,000 to UGX 130,000,000 in total (UGX 80,000,000 senior counsel, UGX 50,000,000 second counsel).
Facts
The respondents, five Members of Parliament, were the successful appellants in a Supreme Court appeal arising from consolidated constitutional petitions concerning the expulsion of four "rebel" NRM MPs and the resulting attempt to declare their parliamentary seats vacant. The Supreme Court awarded the appellants costs. The Registrar, sitting as taxing officer, taxed the bill and awarded an instruction fee of UGX 250,000,000 (UGX 150,000,000 for senior counsel and UGX 100,000,000 for second counsel), reasoning that the appeal raised constitutional issues of great importance to parliamentary democracy, involved 14 issues before the Constitutional Court and ten grounds on appeal, and required substantial research evidenced by seven volumes of authorities. The Attorney General brought this reference under Rule 109, contending the award was manifestly excessive and inconsistent with comparable public-importance cases such as Semogerere, Onyango Obbo and Lukyamuzi, where lower instruction fees had been allowed. The respondents opposed the reference, arguing each case turns on its own facts and that older awards were eroded by inflation.
Issues
- Whether the bill of costs as taxed was, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive.
- Whether the taxing officer applied wrong principles in determining the taxation of the bill of costs.
Orders
- The application is granted.
- The instruction fee is substituted with UGX 80,000,000 for Senior Counsel and UGX 50,000,000 for second counsel.
- Parties to bear own costs in this reference.
Rules and key headnotes
Legislation cited (2)
- Rules of the Supreme Court r.109
- Rules of the Supreme Court, Third Schedule, Para 9(2) and (3)
Cases cited (6)
- Semogerere and Another v Attorney General (Civil Application No. 5 of 2001)
- Onyango Obbo & ors VS AG
- Ken Lukyamuzi VS AG
- Bank of Uganda VS Banco Arabe Espanol, Civil Application No. 23 of 199
- Attorney General v Uganda Blanket Manufacturers Ltd (Civil Application No. 17 of 1993)
- Prichard Richard VS Qarry Service of EA Ltd 1972 EA 162
Full judgment
The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.