Wakilii

Attorney General v Ssemwogerere and Another (Civil Application 20 of 2000)

Supreme Court · [2001] UGSC 22 · 2001 Reference Allowed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Reference and cross-reference to a single judge of the Supreme Court from a taxing officer's decision on a bill of costs
Decision
Reference allowed and cross-reference dismissed; instruction fees reduced from Shs.350,000,000 to Shs.30,000,000, with a total of Shs.31,959,000 awarded to the respondents

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

On a reference and cross-reference from a taxing officer's award of instruction fees, the single judge held that a reference is in the nature of an appeal and a judge will not interfere unless a matter of law or principle is involved or the bill is manifestly excessive or inadequate. The taxing officer had erred by monetising the political and constitutional importance of an appeal whose subject matter had no monetary value, by relying on the government's capacity to pay, and by treating the matter's national interest as warranting a high fee. The Shs.350,000,000 award was based on wrong principles and manifestly excessive; it was reduced to Shs.30,000,000.

Outcome

Reference allowed and cross-reference dismissed; instruction fees reduced from Shs.350,000,000 to Shs.30,000,000, with a total of Shs.31,959,000 awarded to the respondents

Facts

The respondents, leaders of the Democratic Party, petitioned the Constitutional Court challenging the validity of the Referendum and Other Provisions Act 1999. The Attorney General raised four preliminary objections, which were upheld, and the petition was struck out. The respondents successfully appealed to the Supreme Court and were awarded costs. They filed a bill of costs claiming Shs.1,551,959,000, of which Shs.1,550,000,000 was instruction fees. The Attorney General conceded undisputed items of Shs.1,959,000 and proposed an instruction fee of Shs.20,000,000 to Shs.40,000,000. The taxing officer taxed off Shs.1.2 billion and awarded Shs.350,000,000 as instruction fees, valuing the subject matter as priceless and worth billions because it concerned interpretation of the Constitution. Both parties were dissatisfied: the Attorney General brought a reference contending the award was manifestly excessive, and the respondents a cross-reference contending it was manifestly inadequate and that the full claim should be restored.

Issues

  1. Whether the taxing officer's award of Shs.350,000,000 as instruction fees was manifestly excessive.
  2. Whether the award of instruction fees was manifestly inadequate as contended in the cross-reference.
  3. Whether the taxing officer erred in principle by taking into account extraneous matters and by monetising the political and constitutional importance of an appeal whose subject matter had no ascertainable monetary value.

Orders

  • Grounds one, two, three and four of the reference succeed.
  • The cross-reference is dismissed with costs to the applicant.
  • The taxing officer's award of Shs.350,000,000 as instruction fees is reduced to Shs.30,000,000.
  • The undisputed award of Shs.1,959,000 is not interfered with.
  • The respondents are awarded a total of Shs.31,959,000.

Rules and key headnotes

Costs — Taxation — Reference to a Judge — Nature of the reference
A reference from the decision of a taxing officer to a judge is in the nature of an appeal, requiring the judge to reconsider the matters giving rise to the taxation, the arguments raised before the taxing officer, the ruling, the arguments raised on reference and the applicable law.
Costs — Taxation — Interference by judge — Threshold
A judge will not interfere with a taxing officer's assessment of a reasonable fee unless a matter of law or principle is involved, or the bill as taxed is, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate; a manifestly extravagant or manifestly low quantum may itself permit the inference that a wrong principle was applied, but interference is justified only where the error substantially affected the quantum and upholding the award would cause injustice.
Costs — Instruction fees — Statutory guidelines under rule 9(2) of the Third Schedule
An instruction fee must be a sum the taxing officer considers reasonable having regard to the amount involved in the appeal, its nature, importance and difficulty, the interest of the parties, the other costs to be allowed, the general conduct of the proceedings, the fund or person to bear the costs and all other circumstances.
Costs — Instruction fees — Subject matter without ascertainable monetary value
Where the subject matter of an appeal has no ascertainable monetary value, its sentimental, political or constitutional importance cannot properly be monetised to justify a high instruction fee, and the absence of an amount involved removes a relevant taxation factor.
Costs — Taxation — Public interest and access to justice
A taxing officer owes a duty to the public to ensure that costs do not rise above a reasonable level so as to deprive all but the wealthy of access to the courts, and must maintain consistency of awards so that a prospective litigant can be advised of likely liability for costs.
Costs — Taxation — Capacity to pay and public funds
The financial capacity of a party to pay, including that of government, does not of itself justify a large award of costs; where public funds are involved, fairness rather than mere capacity to pay must govern the fund or person to bear the costs.

Legislation cited (7)

Cases cited (15)

  • Attorney General v Uganda Blankets Manufacturers (U) Ltd (Civil Application No. 17 of 1993)
  • De Souza v Kerrao (1960) EA 602
  • Pardan v Osman (1969) EA 520
  • Premchand Richard Ltd and Another v Quarry Services of EA Ltd (1972) EA 162
  • Patrick Makumbi and Another v Sole Electrics (U) Ltd (Civil Application No. 11 of 1994)
  • The Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute v DAPC Board (Civil Application No. 3 of 1995)
  • Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 23 of 1999)
  • Banco Espanol v Bank of Uganda (Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1998)
  • A. L. Kayira and P. K. Ssemogerere v E. Rugumayo and others (Constitutional Case No. 1 of 1979)
  • Prof. E. F. Ssempebwa v Attorney General (Constitutional Case No. 1 of 1986)
  • Steel & Petro v Uganda Sugar Factory (1970) EA 141
  • Makula International v H. E. Cardinal Nsubuga (1982) HCB 11
  • Simpsons Motors v Hendon Corpn [1964] 3 All ER 833
  • Genaral Parts vs. NPART
  • Jaffer Brothers (supra)

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Attorney General v Ssemwogerere and Another (Civil Application 20 of 2000) [2001] UGSC 22 (2 February 2001)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.