Wakilii

Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application 4 of 2000)

Supreme Court · [2000] UGSC 30 · 2000 Reference Allowed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Reference to a single judge of the Supreme Court, under rule 105(1) of the Rules of the court, from a taxing officer's taxation of costs
Decision
Reference allowed; taxing officer's instruction fee of Shs 10,000,000 reduced to Shs 3,000,000; each party to bear its own costs

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The instruction fee for making, supporting or opposing an interlocutory application is governed by paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule, under which the value of the subject matter of the litigation is irrelevant; only the instructions and actual work done determine reasonableness. The taxing officer erred in law by applying paragraph 9(2) (which governs appeals) and treating the disputed taxed costs of Shs 206,433,550 as the subject matter of the stay of execution application. An award of Shs 10,000,000 for a straightforward application disposed of in under forty-five minutes, with allowance for the fall in the value of money, was manifestly excessive. The reference succeeded and the fee was reduced to Shs 3,000,000.

Outcome

Reference allowed; taxing officer's instruction fee of Shs 10,000,000 reduced to Shs 3,000,000; each party to bear its own costs

Facts

Following the Supreme Court's judgment in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1998, the respondent was awarded costs, which the Registrar taxed on 9 November 1999 at Uganda Shs 206,435,550. The applicant referred that taxation to a single judge of the court and, pending that reference, applied for a stay of execution of the taxed bill. The stay was granted with costs to the respondent. On taxation of the costs of that stay application, the taxing officer (Kisawuzi) allowed an instruction fee of Uganda Shs 10,000,000, reasoning that the value of the subject matter — namely the disputed taxed costs of Shs 206,433,550 the applicant feared losing — should be taken into account. The applicant referred that single item to a single judge, contending that the fee was manifestly excessive and that the stay application was a straightforward interlocutory matter disposed of in under forty-five minutes.

Issues

  1. Whether the taxing officer applied the wrong principle by treating the value of the disputed costs as the subject matter and taxing the instruction fee under paragraph 9(2), rather than paragraph 9(1), of the Third Schedule.
  2. Whether the instruction fee of Shs 10,000,000 allowed for the stay of execution application was manifestly excessive.

Orders

  • The reference succeeds.
  • The taxing officer's award of Ug. Shs. 10,000,000 is reduced to Ug. Shs. 3,000,000.
  • Each party to pay its own costs.

Rules and key headnotes

Costs — Taxation — Instruction fees on interlocutory applications — Paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule
The fee allowed for instructions to make, support or oppose an application is governed by paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule and must be determined according to the instructions and the actual work done; the value of the subject matter of the litigation is irrelevant to its assessment.
Costs — Taxation — Distinction between applications and appeals — Paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule
Paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule, which requires the taxing officer to have regard to the amount involved, applies only to instructions to appeal or to oppose an appeal; a taxing officer who applies it, or the value of the subject matter, when taxing an interlocutory application acts on a wrong principle.
Costs — Taxation — Interference with taxing officer's discretion
Where a taxing officer expressly bases his opinion on a wrong principle resulting in the allowance of an amount that is too high or too low, the court will intervene; otherwise the quantum is largely left to the officer's discretion.
Costs — Taxation — Manifestly excessive award — Fall in the value of money
An instruction fee that is manifestly excessive relative to the simplicity of the application and the work actually done will be set aside or reduced, allowance also being made for the fall in the value of money.

Legislation cited (4)

  • Rules of the Supreme Court rule 105(1)
  • Rules of the Supreme Court rule 105(4)
  • Rules of the Supreme Court Third Schedule paragraph 9(1)
  • Rules of the Supreme Court Third Schedule paragraph 9(2)

Cases cited (7)

  • Premchand Ltd And Another v. Quarry Services of East Africa And Others 1972 E.A 162
  • Ambalal N. Patel Ltd v Marietti (1957) E.A. 194
  • Departed Asians Property Custodian Board v Jaffer Brothers Ltd (Civil Application No. 13 of 1999)
  • Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute v Departed Asians Property Custodian Board (Civil Application No. 3 of 1995)
  • Alexander J. Okello v M/s Kayondo & Co. Advocates (Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1992)
  • Patrick Makumbi (Civil Application No. 11 of 1994)
  • Attorney General v Uganda Blanket Manufacturers (1973) Ltd (Civil Application No. 17 of 1993)

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application 4 of 2000) [2000] UGSC 30 (4 May 2000)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.