Wakilii

Byaruhanga Katumba v Kiwalabye Musoke (Civil Appeal 2 of 1998)

Court of Appeal · [1998] UGCA 55 · 1998 Appeal Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Civil appeal from a High Court decision on an election petition
Decision
Appeal dismissed; the High Court decision cancelling the election results and ordering fresh elections stands

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The Court of Appeal considered whether Section 143(2) of the Local Government Act 1997, requiring an election petition to be heard and determined within three months, was mandatory or directory. Applying principles for construing 'shall', the court held the provision was directory only, intended to ensure expeditious determination of election petitions rather than to oust the court's jurisdiction. Since the section did not expressly or by clear words provide for ouster of jurisdiction on non-compliance, a judgment delivered after the prescribed period was not null and void. The court retained inherent power to extend time to meet the ends of justice. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Outcome

Appeal dismissed; the High Court decision cancelling the election results and ordering fresh elections stands

Facts

The appellant was elected L.C.V Chairperson of Kiboga District in the April 1998 elections. The respondent, an unsuccessful candidate, filed an election petition in the High Court under Section 139 of the Local Government Act 1997, contending that the appellant was not academically qualified for election. The High Court (Arach-Amoko J.) upheld the petition on 27 August 1998, cancelled the election results, set aside the appellant's election, ordered fresh elections, and awarded costs to the respondent. The appellant appealed. At the hearing, Ground 1 of the memorandum of appeal was struck out following a preliminary objection that it was too general and contravened the Rules of the Court of Appeal. Only Ground 2 was argued: that the High Court judgment, having been delivered after the statutory three-month period prescribed by Section 143(2) of the Local Government Act, was null and void. It was conceded that the judgment was delivered after expiry of the statutory period.

Issues

  1. Whether Section 143(2) of the Local Government Act 1997 is mandatory such that judgment delivered after the prescribed three-month period is null and void.
  2. Whether the failure to determine the election petition within the statutory period ousts the jurisdiction of the court over the matter.

Orders

  • The appeal is dismissed.
  • Costs of the appeal to the respondent, here and in the court below.

Rules and key headnotes

Statutory Interpretation — Meaning of 'shall' — Mandatory versus directory provisions
The mere use of the word 'shall' in a statute is not necessarily mandatory; whether a provision is mandatory or directory depends on the whole scope and purpose of the statute, the importance of the provision in relation to the general object of the Act, its significance for the protection of individual rights, and the consequences of holding it mandatory.
Statutory Interpretation — Ouster of jurisdiction — Requirement of express or clear words
For a statute to oust the jurisdiction of the court, it must state so expressly or by clear words; a provision that does not expressly or clearly provide for ouster of jurisdiction on non-compliance will not be construed to do so.
Electoral Law — Election Petitions — Time limit for hearing under Local Government Act s.143(2)
Section 143(2) of the Local Government Act 1997, requiring an election petition to be heard and determined within three months, is directory and not mandatory; it is concerned with the speed of trial to ensure expeditious determination, and does not oust the court's jurisdiction where the petition is decided after the prescribed period.
Civil Procedure — Court's inherent power to extend time
Where a statutory time limit for the determination of a matter is construed as directory rather than mandatory, the court retains inherent power to extend the time limit to meet the ends of justice.

Legislation cited (9)

  • Local Government Act 1997 s.139
  • Local Government Act 1997 s.143(2)
  • Local Government Act 1997 s.173
  • Parliamentary Elections (Interim Provisions) Statute No.4 of 1996
  • Parliamentary Elections (Election Petitions) Rules 1995 rule 13
  • Parliamentary Elections (Election Petitions) Rules 1995 rule 19
  • Cooperative Societies Act 1970 s.73
  • Company Directors Disqualification Act 1991 s.16(1)
  • Rules of the Court of Appeal (Legal Notice No. 11 of 1996) rule 81

Cases cited (4)

  • Mukula International Ltd v Cardinal Nsubuga and Another (Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1981)
  • David B. Kayondo v The Cooperative Bank Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1991)
  • Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Langridge [1991] 3 All ER 591
  • Jaffer Brothers Ltd Vs Mohamed Magici Bagalaliwo and 2 Others Unreported Civil Appeal No. ... 1997 (CA)

Full judgment

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Byaruhanga Katumba v Kiwalabye Musoke (Civil Appeal 2 of 1998) [1998] UGCA 55 (20 November 1998)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.