Wakilii

Cottar v Lime Limited and Another (Civ. App. No. 21-1937,)

East African Court of Appeal · [1938] EACA 18 · 1938 Appeal Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Appeal from decision of Webb, J. (Kenya) dismissing action under Civil Procedure Rules Order VI rule 29 for failure to disclose reasonable cause of action
Decision
Appeal dismissed; plaint struck out for failure to disclose reasonable cause of action

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

Citator coverage is limited to judgments in the Wakilii corpus and source-matched treatment records. Absence of a signal is not an assertion that the case remains good law.

AI-generated summary. This summary was generated by AI from the full text of the judgment. It may contain errors or omissions—always read the source judgment before relying on it.

Holding

A plaint claiming entitlement to a mining lease must disclose what right the plaintiff has to obtain the lease and whether such right arises by contract or under statute. Where a plaintiff relies on breach of statutory duty arising independently of contract, the statute must be referred to and the facts bringing the case within it must be sufficiently pleaded. A plaint that fails to disclose these material facts does not reveal a reasonable cause of action and may be struck out under Order VI rule 29.

Outcome

Appeal dismissed; plaint struck out for failure to disclose reasonable cause of action

Facts

The appellant registered four mining claims in October 1922 which were amalgamated into one claim under the Mining Ordinance 1912 and registered in his name on 10 February 1923. He worked and developed the claim with the knowledge of the Attorney General and obtained an Export Licence and Prospecting Licence under the Mining Ordinance 1925. No lease was ever issued despite his application. In October 1936 the Commissioner of Mines warned him to cease work. In 1937 an Exclusive Prospecting Licence was granted to the second respondent, who took possession of the area and ore won by the appellant. The appellant sued for a declaration that he was entitled to a lease, an account of ore won, and alternatively compensation for buildings, improvements, work and discoveries. The trial judge struck out the plaint under Order VI rule 29 on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action because it failed to specify whether the appellant's claimed right arose by contract or under one or other of the Mining Ordinances.

Issues

  1. Whether the plaint disclosed a reasonable cause of action where it claimed entitlement to a mining lease but failed to specify whether the right arose by contract or under one or other of the Mining Ordinances.
  2. Whether the defendants' proper course was to apply under Order VI rule 27 for particulars rather than to strike out the plaint under Order VI rule 29.
  3. Whether a plaintiff relying on a statutory right must plead the specific statute and the facts bringing the case within it.

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed.
  • Costs of the appeal to the respondents.

Rules and key headnotes

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Disclosure of Cause of Action — Statutory Rights
Where a plaintiff relies on breach of a statutory duty arising independently of contract, the statute or ordinance must be referred to in the pleadings and the facts which bring the case within it must be sufficiently pleaded.
Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Material Facts — Connecting Link Between Facts and Rights Claimed
A plaint must disclose not only the facts relied upon but also the connecting link between those facts and the rights claimed, including identification of the statutory provision under which the right is said to arise.
Civil Procedure — Striking Out Pleadings — Order VI Rule 29 — Reasonable Cause of Action
A plaint may be struck out under Order VI rule 29 where it discloses no reasonable cause of action, irrespective of whether it is frivolous or vexatious. A plaint discloses no reasonable cause of action where it fails to identify what right has been violated and the legal foundation of that right.
Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Necessity to Plead Statute — Judicial Notice
Even where the court takes judicial notice of a statute as part of the law of the land, a plaintiff must allege the facts required to apply that statute to the plaintiff's claim. The fact that a statute is part of the law does not abrogate the necessity of pleading which provision of that law constitutes the right that has been violated.

Legislation cited (14)

Cases cited (11)

  • Moore v Lawson (31 TLR 418)
  • Attorney General of the Duchy of Lancaster v London and North Western Railway (1892) 3 Ch D 174
  • Dyson v Attorney General (1911) 1 KB 410
  • Dadswell v Jacobs (34 Ch D 278)
  • Worthington and Co v Belton (18 TLR 438)
  • Roberts v Charing Cross, Euston and Hampstead Railway Co (87 LT 732)
  • Gilleghan v Minister of Health (47 TLR 439)
  • Thorp v Holdsworth (45 LJ Ch 406)
  • Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508
  • Philipps v Philipps (4 QBD 127)
  • South Hetton Coal Co v Haswell, Shotton and Easington Coal and Coke Co (1888) 1 Ch D 465

Full judgment

↓ Download PDF

The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Cottar v Lime Limited and Another (Civ. App. No. 21-1937,) [1938] EACA 18 (1 January 1938)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.