Wakilii

David Kedi v Attorney General (Civil Suit 286 of 1991)

High Court · [1991] UGHC 90 · 1991 Preliminary Objection Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Ruling on preliminary objection raised by defendant challenging competence of suit and limitation period
Decision
Preliminary objection dismissed; matter to proceed to hearing on merit

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

Held that the plaintiff was entitled to amend the plaint under Order 6 rule 18 to correct a typing error in the date when the cause of action arose, notwithstanding that the application was made orally rather than by chamber summons. After amendment, the suit was not statute barred because the plaintiff's grounds for exemption based on disability (imprisonment) were sufficiently shown in the plaint. Order 7 rule 6 requires only that facts constituting grounds for exemption be exhibited, not specifically pleaded. The preliminary objection was overruled.

Outcome

Preliminary objection dismissed; matter to proceed to hearing on merit

Facts

The plaintiff, David Kedi, sued the Attorney General for an incident arising from his arrest on 19 September 1989 by NRA intelligence officers. He was released on 6 August 1990. He served a statutory notice on the Attorney General stating that the cause of action arose on 19/9/1989, but the plaint stated it arose on 19/9/1990. The suit was filed on 25 January 1991. The defendant raised a preliminary objection that: (i) the suit was incompetent because the statutory notice did not relate to the cause of action pleaded in the plaint; (ii) the suit was filed beyond the 12-month limitation period; and (iii) the plaintiff had not specifically pleaded disability to rely on the exemption. The plaintiff applied orally to amend the plaint to correct the date.

Issues

  1. Whether the suit was incompetent for failure to serve proper statutory notice as required by s.1(1)(a) of Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 20/69 given the discrepancy in dates between the notice and the plaint.
  2. Whether the plaintiff should be allowed to amend the plaint to correct the date when the cause of action arose.
  3. Whether the suit was statute barred under s.2(1)(a) of Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 20/69.
  4. Whether the plaintiff could rely on the exemption based on disability under s.4 of the Act without specifically pleading disability in the plaint as required by Order 7 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Orders

  • Plaintiff allowed to amend the plaint by substituting the date 19/9/90 appearing in paragraph 5 with 19/9/89.
  • Preliminary objection overruled.

Rules and key headnotes

Civil Procedure — Amendment of Pleadings — Oral Application to Amend at Trial — Order 6 rule 18 and Order 6 rule 30
The requirement under Order 6 rule 30 that an interlocutory application to amend pleadings be made by chamber summons does not preclude the court from dealing with an oral application to amend in the course of hearing. The words 'at any stage of the proceedings' in Order 6 rule 18 permit oral applications and are consistent with s.103 of the Civil Procedure Act which allows amendment at any time.
Civil Procedure — Amendment of Pleadings — Test for Allowing Amendment — Injustice and Compensation by Costs
Amendments to pleadings sought before the hearing should be freely allowed if they can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs.
Civil Procedure — Limitation — Pleading Grounds of Exemption — Order 7 rule 6
Order 7 rule 6 requires that where a suit is instituted after expiry of the limitation period, the plaint shall show the grounds upon which exemption is claimed. The rule requires that facts constituting the grounds for exemption be exhibited or displayed in the plaint; it does not require specific pleading of the word 'disability' or formal invocation of the statutory provision. It is sufficient that facts from which a reasonable inference of exemption can be made are set out in the plaint.
Civil Procedure — Suits Against Government — Statutory Notice — Discrepancy in Dates — Effect of Amendment
Where a statutory notice served on the Attorney General states the correct date when the cause of action arose but the plaint contains a typing error, the objection that no proper statutory notice was served collapses once the plaint is amended to reflect the correct date appearing in the notice. The defendant received proper notice for purposes of investigation during the 60-day notice period.

Legislation cited (7)

Cases cited (9)

  • Pamba v Coffee Marketing Board (Civil Suit No. 1 of 1983)
  • Suwali Kidimu v Attorney General (Civil Suit No. 14 of 1971)
  • Sayikwo Murome v Yorno Kuko and Another (Civil Suit No. 161 of 1985)
  • V.F. Castelino Vs Rodrigues 1972 ULR Part 11
  • General Manager E & H Vs Thierstein 41/1960/7 E A 354
  • Eastern Bakery Vs Castelino 1958/7 E A 461
  • D H Bawa Ltd Vs G S Didar Singh 1964/7 E A 232
  • African Overseas Trading Co. Vs Tanksukhs Acharya 1964/7 E A 468
  • James Sempa v Attorney General

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

David Kedi v Attorney General (Civil Suit 286 of 1991) [1991] UGHC 90 (1 January 1991)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.