Housing Finance Bank Ltd v Uganda Revenue Authority (Miscellaneous Application No 79 of 2020)
Observed later treatment
No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.
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Holding
On an application for a certificate of importance and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal held that party consent does not relieve the court of its duty to satisfy itself that the legal test is met: the intended appeal must concern a matter of law that is of great public or general importance, which the applicant bears the onus to identify. Applying that test, the court found the intended appeal raised questions of jurisdiction, of taxation affecting many people's commercial affairs, and of the discharge of duties by a public officer (the Uganda Revenue Authority). The application was allowed, the certificate granted, and leave to appeal Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2012 to the Supreme Court was granted.
Outcome
Certificate of importance and leave to appeal Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2012 to the Supreme Court granted.
Facts
The Uganda Revenue Authority successfully appealed to the High Court against a decision of the Tax Appeals Tribunal. Housing Finance Bank Ltd, dissatisfied with the High Court decision, appealed to the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2012. The Court of Appeal struck out that appeal for lack of jurisdiction, in a two-to-one decision with Justice Kenneth Kakuru (RIP) dissenting. The applicant contended that the parties had not been afforded an opportunity to address the question of jurisdiction before the appeal was struck out. The applicant then brought this application for a certificate that the matter raises questions of great public importance and for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The respondent did not file a reply but instead filed a purported consent order conceding the application.
Issues
- Whether the applicant satisfied the legal test for the grant of a certificate that the intended appeal raises a question of great public or general importance and for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the court may grant such leave merely because the parties have consented to it.
Orders
- The application is allowed.
- A certificate of importance involving questions of great public importance arising out of Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2012 is granted.
- Leave is granted to appeal Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2012 to the Supreme Court.
- The questions to be considered include whether an appeal to the High Court from the Tax Appeals Tribunal is a first or second appeal, whether an application to the Tax Appeals Tribunal is competent, and whether the court was right in holding that the applicant had no right of appeal in light of Section 72(1) of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 71.
- No order as to costs.
Rules and key headnotes
Legislation cited (5)
- Civil Procedure Act Cap 71 s.72(1)
- Judicature (Supreme Court Rules) Directions Rule 39(1)(a)
- Judicature (Supreme Court Rules) Directions Rule 41
- Judicature (Supreme Court Rules) Directions Rule 2(2)
- Judicature (Court of Appeal) Rules Rule 2(2)
Cases cited (2)
- Asumani Mugenyi v M Buwule (Civil Application No. 0245 of 2011)
- Hermanus Phillippus Steyn v Giovanni Gneechi-Ruscone (Application No. 04 of 2010)
Full judgment
The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.