Jamada Luzinda v Attorney General (Civil Appeal No. 90 of 2012)

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

Citator coverage is limited to judgments in the Wakilii corpus and source-matched treatment records. Absence of a signal is not an assertion that the case remains good law.

Holding

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's judicial review claim was time barred. The appellant was dismissed in 1980, learnt of it in 1984, but filed his complaint in 2002 and sought certiorari well outside the six-month period for judicial review and the three-year limitation for actions against Government. The court held that the Public Service Commission's handling of the complaint and the Solicitor General's letter did not amount to an acknowledgement reviving the cause of action under the Limitation Act. Once statute barred, always statute barred; Article 126(2)(e) of the Constitution could not rescue a defaulting litigant who slept on his rights for over twenty years.

Outcome

Appeal dismissed as time barred and incompetent; High Court ruling upheld

Facts

The appellant, Jamada K. Luzinda, was a civil servant first appointed in 1965 and rose to Permanent Secretary by 1976. He was suspended in April 1979 and dismissed on 1 December 1980, allegedly learning of the dismissal in 1984. He took no recorded action until 24 February 2002, when he lodged a complaint contesting his dismissal and the forfeiture of his terminal benefits with the Public Service Commission. On 1 April 2010 the Solicitor General pronounced that the dismissal and forfeiture were lawful. Dissatisfied, the appellant filed an application for judicial review at the High Court seeking certiorari to quash that decision. The trial judge dismissed the application with costs as time barred. The appellant argued that the Public Service Commission's entertaining of his complaint amounted to an acknowledgement reviving the cause of action and that Article 126(2)(e) should excuse the delay.

Issues

1. Whether the trial judge erred in holding that the appellant could not appeal against the Solicitor General's decision because he was not the appointing authority.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in holding that the appellant's claim for judicial review was time barred.

Orders

• Appeal dismissed with costs in this Court and in the Court below.
• The ruling and orders of the trial court are upheld.

Rules and key headnotes

Legislation cited (7)

• Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 72 s.3(2)
• Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 72 s.5
• Limitation Act s.22(4)
• Limitation Act s.23(1)
• Judicature Act 1967 (repealed) s.34(5) & (6)
• Constitution of the Republic of Uganda Article 126(2)(e)
• Court of Appeal Rules Rule 30(1)

Cases cited (10)

• Fr. Narcensio Begumisa and Others v Eric Tibebaaga (Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2002)
• Banco Arabe Espanol v Bank of Uganda (Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1998)
• Odinga & others vs Nairobi City Council {1990-1994} EA 482
• Roland Browne vs Public Service Commission HCVAP 023 of 2010(Saint Lucia)
• Jones v Bellegrove Properties Ltd [1949] 2 All ER 198
• Arnold v. General Electricity Generating Board [1988] A.C 288
• Nicholson v. England [1926] 2KB 93
• Mohammad B. Kasasa v Jaspher Buyonga Sirasi Bwogi (Civil Appeal No. 42 of 2008)
• Hilton v Satton Steam Laundry [1946] IKB 61
• Kasirye Byaruhanga & Co Advocates v Uganda Development Bank (Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1997)

The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.