Wakilii

Kizza and Another v Camusat Uganda Limited (Labour Dispute Reference No. 81 of 2017)

Industrial Court · [2022] UGIC 25 · 2022 Preliminary Objection Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Preliminary objection to labour dispute reference on grounds of time bar
Decision
Preliminary objection dismissed; matter to proceed to hearing on the merits

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The Industrial Court held that Section 93(7) of the Employment Act is directory, not mandatory. The provision gives a claimant the option to refer a matter to the Industrial Court if the labour officer has not decided within 90 days, but does not prohibit the labour officer from continuing to hear the matter beyond that period. The word 'may' confers discretion on the claimant, not a mandatory time bar. The preliminary objection was overruled.

Outcome

Preliminary objection dismissed; matter to proceed to hearing on the merits

Facts

The claimants lodged a complaint with the Labour Officer on 13 April 2018 concerning overtime and holiday pay. The respondent was notified on 3 May 2018. Mediation was scheduled for 11 June 2018 but was rescheduled at the respondent's request to 18 June 2018. The respondent did not appear on that date and the matter was adjourned to 29 August 2018. On 29 August 2018, the parties agreed to search for proof of overtime. On 2 October 2018, the respondent indicated records were unclear and needed cross-checking. On 12 November 2018, the respondent provided limited information. On 6 February 2019, the matter was referred to the Industrial Court, 290 days after the initial complaint. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the reference was time-barred under Section 93(7) of the Employment Act.

Issues

  1. Whether the labour dispute reference was time-barred for having been entertained by the labour officer beyond 90 days and referred to the Industrial Court 290 days after the lapse of the 90-day period.
  2. Whether the provisions of Section 93(7) of the Employment Act are mandatory or directory.
  3. Whether the use of the word 'may' in Section 93(7) of the Employment Act confers discretion on the claimant to refer a matter to the Industrial Court after 90 days, or imposes a mandatory time limit on the labour officer.

Orders

  • Preliminary objection overruled.
  • No order as to costs.
  • Matter to be expeditiously disposed of.
  • Matter set down for hearing.

Rules and key headnotes

Employment & Labour — Labour Disputes — Time Limits — Section 93(7) of the Employment Act
Section 93(7) of the Employment Act is directory, not mandatory. It gives a claimant the option to refer a matter to the Industrial Court if the labour officer has not issued a decision within 90 days, but does not prohibit the labour officer from continuing to hear and determine the matter beyond that period.
Statutory Interpretation — Literal Rule — Clear and Unambiguous Language
Where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be interpreted according to their literal and grammatical meaning. If the language is plain on its face, it is conclusive evidence of legislative intention.
Statutory Interpretation — 'May' versus 'Shall' — Permissive versus Mandatory Language
The word 'may' is prima facie permissive and conveys that the authority has an option to do or not do an act. It does not impose a mandatory obligation unless the context requires otherwise. In contrast, 'shall' is mandatory. If the legislature intended a provision to be mandatory, it would have used 'shall' instead of 'may'.
Civil Procedure — Preliminary Objections — Time Bar — Directory Provisions
Where a statutory provision is directory rather than mandatory, and there is no clear sanction for non-compliance, a party cannot be faulted for acting beyond the stated time period. A preliminary objection based on such a provision will fail.

Legislation cited (3)

Cases cited (11)

  • Majidu Shire v Kakira Sugar Works (Labour Dispute No. 44 of 2017)
  • Uganda Revenue Authority v Siraje Hassan Kajura and Others (Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2015)
  • NSSF v URA (High Court Civil Appeal No. 29 of 2020)
  • Wicks v DPP [1947] AC 362
  • Foundation for Human Rights Initiative v Attorney General (Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 3 of 2009)
  • Massy v Council of the Municipality of Yass (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 499
  • Johnson's Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Shire of Maffra [1949] ALR 89
  • Daemar v Soper [1981] 1 NZLR 66
  • Engineer John Eric Mugyenzi v UEGCL (Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 167 of 2018)
  • Sitenda Sebalu v Sam K Njuba (Election Petition Appeal No. 26 of 2006)
  • Seforoza Naymuchoncho and Andrew Musoke v Attorney General (Miscellaneous Cause No. 241 of 2017)

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Kizza_and_Another_v_Camusat_Uganda_Limited_(Labour_Dispute_Reference_No._81_of_2017)_[2022]_UGIC_25_(28_October_2022)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.