Luzinda v Attorney General (Civil Appeal No. 090 of 2012)

Observed later treatment

Citator coverage is limited to judgments in the Wakilii corpus and source-matched treatment records. Absence of a signal is not an assertion that the case remains good law.

Holding

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the High Court's refusal of judicial review of a decision affirming the appellant's 1980 dismissal and forfeiture of terminal benefits. The appellant, dismissed in 1980 and aware by 1984, only complained in 2002 and sought certiorari long out of the six-month judicial review period and the three-year contractual limitation against Government. The Court held the claim was statute barred, that the Solicitor General's letter and the mere handling of the complaint did not amount to a written acknowledgement reviving the cause of action under sections 22(4) and 23 of the Limitation Act, and that Article 126(2)(e) could not rescue a defaulting litigant. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Outcome

Appeal dismissed with costs; High Court ruling upholding the time bar affirmed

Facts

The appellant, Jamada K Luzinda, was a civil servant first appointed in 1965, later promoted through several posts and appointed Permanent Secretary in 1976. He was suspended in April 1979 and dismissed by letter dated 1 December 1980, forfeiting his terminal benefits. He stated he first learnt of the dismissal in 1984. He lodged a complaint contesting the dismissal in February 2002, about 22 years after dismissal. On 1 April 2010 the Solicitor General pronounced that the dismissal and forfeiture were lawful. The appellant then applied to the High Court for judicial review seeking certiorari to quash that decision. The High Court (Musoke J) dismissed the application with costs as time barred, prompting this appeal. There was no evidence of any complaint lodged with the appointing authority, courts, or the Public Service Commission between 1984 and 2002, and no signed written acknowledgement of the claim was produced.

Issues

1. Whether the trial judge erred when she held that the appellant could not appeal against the Solicitor General's decision because he was not the appointing authority.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in law when she held that the claim was time barred.

Orders

• Appeal dismissed.
• Costs awarded in this Court and in the Court below.
• The ruling and orders of the trial court upheld.

Rules and key headnotes

Legislation cited (7)

• Limitation Act s.22(4)
• Limitation Act s.23(1)
• Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 72 s.3(2)
• Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 72 s.5
• Judicature Act 1967 (repealed) s.34(5) & (6)
• Constitution of Uganda Article 126(2)(e)
• Court of Appeal Rules r.30(1)

Cases cited (10)

• Begumisa v Tibebaaga (Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2002)
• Banco Arabe Espanol v Bank of Uganda (Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1998)
• Odinga & others vs Nairobi City Council {1990-1994} EA 482
• Roland Browne vs Public Service Commission HCVAP 023 of 2010(Saint Lucia)
• Jones v Bellegrove Properties Ltd [1949] 2 All ER 198
• Arnold v. General Electricity Generating Board [1988] A.C 288
• Nicholson v. England [1926] 2KB 93
• Kasasa v Bwogi (Civil Appeal No. 42 of 2008)
• Hilton v Satton Steam Laundry [1946] IKB 61
• Kasirye Byaruhanga & Co Advocates v Uganda Development Bank (Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1997)

Cases citing this judgment (1)

How later Ugandan judgments in the Wakilii corpus have cited this case. Treatment labels come from Sequitur — Uganda’s citator — each backed by a verbatim span from the citing judgment, and are not an assertion that this case is, or is not, good law.

• Junju v Masindi Municipal Council (Civil Suit 35 of 2019)

The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.