Wakilii

Magson Construction Co. Limited v Uganda Airlines Corporation (Civil Suit 104 of 1990)

High Court · [1990] UGHC 39 · 1990 Preliminary Objection Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Ruling on preliminary objection to competence of suit for failure to serve notice of intention to sue
Decision
Preliminary objection dismissed; suit to proceed

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The High Court dismissed a preliminary objection that the suit was incompetent for failure to serve statutory notice of intention to sue on a scheduled corporation. The court held that the plaintiff had effectively served notice on 5th December 1989 and that the mode of service need not include mandatory acknowledgement of receipt. The 60-day statutory period expired on 3rd February 1990 and the suit filed on 13th February 1990 was not premature. Service was established by sworn evidence of the plaintiff's law clerk, corroborated by a contemporaneous file entry, notwithstanding the absence of formal acknowledgement and the defendant's initial denial.

Outcome

Preliminary objection dismissed; suit to proceed

Facts

The plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No. 104 of 1990 against Uganda Airlines Corporation, a scheduled corporation. The defendant raised a preliminary objection that the suit was incompetent because no notice of intention to sue had been served as required by the Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969. The plaintiff's counsel called Willy Mukasa, a law clerk, who testified on oath that he delivered the notice to the office of the Corporation Secretary on 5th December 1989. Mukasa stated he handed the notice to an employee named Gladys, who entered the Corporation Secretary's office and returned to say it was okay. Mukasa made a contemporaneous entry on the office file cover dated 5th December 1989. Defence counsel produced the notice during cross-examination; it bore a stamp dated 22nd January 1990. The defendant contended service occurred on 22nd January 1990, making the suit filed on 13th February 1990 premature. The plaintiff argued the law did not require formal acknowledgement and that sworn evidence established service on 5th December 1989.

Issues

  1. Whether the suit was competent having regard to the requirement to serve notice of intention to sue under the Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969.
  2. Whether the statutory notice of intention to sue was effectively served on the defendant.
  3. Whether the notice was served on 5th December 1989 or 22nd January 1990, and whether the suit was filed prematurely.

Orders

  • Preliminary objection dismissed.
  • Costs of the preliminary objection awarded to the plaintiff.

Rules and key headnotes

Civil Procedure — Notice of Intention to Sue — Scheduled Corporations — Mode of Service
The Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969 does not prescribe a mandatory mode of service for notice of intention to sue a scheduled corporation, nor does it require the intended defendant to acknowledge receipt of the notice in writing. Service is effective when the notice is delivered to or left at the office of the person specified in schedule 1 to the Act, and such delivery may be established by sworn evidence without documentary acknowledgement.
Civil Procedure — Notice of Intention to Sue — Burden of Proof — Service
Where a plaintiff produces sworn evidence that notice of intention to sue was served on a specified date and identifies the defendant's employee who received it, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut that evidence. The defendant's failure to call the named employee or produce contrary evidence may support a finding that service was effected as claimed by the plaintiff.
Statutory Interpretation — Time Computation — Exclusion of First Day
Under section 34(1)(a) of the Interpretation Decree 1976, when computing a period of days from the doing of any act for the purpose of any statute, the day on which the act is done is excluded. Where notice of intention to sue is served on a scheduled corporation, the 60-day statutory period prescribed by the Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969 begins on the day after service.

Legislation cited (4)

  • Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969 s.1
  • Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969 schedule 1
  • Civil Procedure And Limitations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969 schedule 2
  • Interpretation Decree 1976 s.34(1)(a)

Cases cited (1)

  • Lyakiye v Attorney-General [1973] EALR 124

Full judgment

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Magson Construction Co. Limited v Uganda Airlines Corporation (Civil Suit 104 of 1990) [1990] UGHC 39 (17 July 1990)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.