Mamuji v Dar and Sons (Civil Appeal No. 12-1935)
Observed later treatment
No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.
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Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish unequivocal exclusive possession sufficient to dispossess the respondent. Acts of user that do not interfere with the owner's intended purpose do not constitute dispossession. The Court found that the Mombasa Cold Storage Company ceased operations in 1921, creating a break in adverse possession. When the appellant took possession in 1925, a fresh right of action accrued to the respondent, and the appellant's possession of approximately 8.5 years was insufficient to establish title by limitation under the twelve-year statutory period.
Outcome
Respondent's title to the disputed land confirmed; appellant's claim to title by adverse possession rejected
Facts
The respondent sought recovery of land forming part of Plot 91 in Mombasa. The disputed portion consisted of a landing-place and steps constructed in 1920 by Mohamed Ali on behalf of his brother Gulamhussein, then owner of adjacent Plot 34. Plot 91 was originally part of Plot 88, registered in 1918 to Abdulhussein Karimji. In 1920, Abdulhussein conveyed Plot 88/1 (which included Plot 34) to Gulamhussein, who conveyed Plot 34 to the Mombasa Cold Storage Company in December 1920. The Company used the landing-place and steps until it closed down in 1921. Plot 91 was acquired by the respondent from Abdulhussein in 1923. The appellant purchased Plot 34 from the Company in 1925 and converted the rough steps into a concrete stairway. The appellant claimed title by adverse possession, asserting that he and his predecessors had been in possession for over twelve years. The trial judge found no evidence of possession between 1921 and 1925 and held that time ceased to run in 1921, with a new period commencing in 1925.
Issues
- Whether the appellant and his predecessors in title had been in adverse possession of the disputed land for a period exceeding twelve years sufficient to bar the respondent's claim.
- Whether acts of user committed on land which do not interfere with the owner's intended purpose amount to dispossession.
- Whether a break in adverse possession by abandonment causes time to cease running and a fresh right of action to accrue when a new intruder enters.
Orders
- Appeal dismissed.
- Costs awarded to the respondent.
Rules and key headnotes
Legislation cited (3)
- Indian Limitation Act arts. 142-4
- Land Titles Ordinance 1908
- Indian Transfer of Property Act s.8
Cases cited (17)
- Marshall v Taylor [1895] 1 Ch 641
- Leigh v Jack (1879) 5 Ex D 264
- Duke of Beaufort v John Aird and Co (1904) 20 TLR 602
- Samuel Johnson and Sons Ltd v Brock [1907] 2 Ch 533
- Belize Estate and Produce Co v Quilter [1897] AC 367
- Raja Chandra v. Keshaw (42 I.A. 40)
- Innasimuttu Udayan v Upakarath Udayan (1900) 23 Mad 10
- Steadman v. Smith (120 E.R. 1)
- Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 ChD 537
- Norton v London and North Western Railway Co (1879) 13 ChD 268
- Van Diemen's Land Co v Table Cape Marine Board [1906] AC 92
- Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19
- Philpot v. Bath (20 T.L.R. 589, 21 T.L.R. 634)
- Bobbett v South Eastern Railway Co (1882) 9 QBD 424
- Searby v Tottenham Railway Co (1868) LR 5 Eq 409
- Trustees Executors and Agency Co v Short (1888) 13 App Cas 793
- Willis v Earl Howe [1893] 2 Ch 545
Full judgment
The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.