Muwanga Kivumbi v Attorney General (Civil Reference 38 of 2017)
Observed later treatment
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Holding
On a taxation reference under rule 109, the single Justice held that the taxing officer's award of UGX 6,000,000 as instruction fees was manifestly low. The matter was of great public importance — the appellant having challenged the constitutionality of section 32 of the Police Act and protected freedoms of assembly — and involved substantial research and volume of work. The claimed UGX 100,000,000 was excessive, particularly as the fund bearing the costs was the national treasury and taxpayers. Applying para 9(2) of the Third Schedule and the principle that no magic formula governs taxation, the court substituted an award of UGX 80,000,000 as reasonable. The reference was allowed.
Outcome
Reference allowed; taxing officer's instruction-fee award of UGX 6,000,000 substituted with UGX 80,000,000.
Facts
The applicant had successfully challenged the constitutionality of section 32 of the Police Act before the Constitutional Court, which limited the Inspector General of Police's power to prohibit assemblies. On appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant secured an order for costs in that court and the courts below. On taxation of the resulting bill of costs, the Registrar, sitting as taxing officer, awarded UGX 6,000,000 as instruction fees. The applicant, contending that this sum was manifestly low and failed to reflect the case's public importance, contribution to jurisprudence, and the volume of research undertaken, referred the matter to a single Justice and sought enhancement of the award to UGX 100,000,000. The respondent supported the taxing officer's award, arguing no money was involved in the appeal and that the short interval between judgment and taxation negated any inflation argument.
Issues
- Whether the taxing officer's award of UGX 6,000,000 as instruction fees was manifestly so low as to amount to a wrongful failure to exercise discretion judiciously.
- What sum is reasonable as instruction fees in the circumstances of the appeal.
Orders
- The sum of 6 million as instruction fees is manifestly low and is substituted with 80,000,000/= (Eighty million shillings).
- The application is allowed.
Rules and key headnotes
Legislation cited (4)
- Supreme Court Rules r.109
- Supreme Court Rules Third Schedule para 9(2) and (3)
- Police Act (Cap 303) s.32
- Constitution of Uganda articles 20, 21, 29, 38, 42, 43
Cases cited (8)
- Semogerere vs AG
- Onyango Obbo vs AG
- Lukyamuzi Ken vs AG
- Ssekikubo vs AG
- Attorney General V John Mark & anor
- Nobie Builders (U) v Sietco (Civil Application No. 16 of 2000)
- Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 23 of 1999)
- Attorney General v Uganda Blanket Manufacturers (Civil Application No. 17 of 1993)
Cases citing this judgment (4)
How later Ugandan judgments in the Wakilii corpus have cited this case. Treatment labels come from Sequitur — Uganda’s citator — each backed by a verbatim span from the citing judgment, and are not an assertion that this case is, or is not, good law.
- Insurance Regulatory Authority v Leads Insurance Limited (Taxation Reference 4 of 2023)
- Falcon Estates Limited v Bismillah Trading Co. Limited (Taxation Reference 3 of 2023)
- Uganda Taxi Operators & Drivers Association v Uganda Revenue Authority (Taxation Civil Reference 25 of 2017)
- Mbale Resort Hotel (U) Limited v Babcon (U) Limited (Taxation Civil Reference 18 of 2018)
Full judgment
The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.