Wakilii

Rex v Rwakweba (Criminal Appeal No. 119 of 1943)

East African Court of Appeal · [1943] EACA 37 · 1943 Appeal Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Criminal appeal from conviction for murder in the High Court of Tanganyika
Decision
Conviction for murder upheld

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The Court of Appeal held that while evidence of a child given on affirmation under s.146 Criminal Procedure Code does not strictly require corroboration, courts should exercise great care before acting on such evidence. Previous contemporaneous statements by a witness may afford corroboration of trial evidence, particularly where the defence suggests the witness was influenced. The Court found the trial judge fully justified in accepting the child witness's evidence where she had made substantially the same statement immediately after the crime, before any alarm was raised. Appeal dismissed.

Outcome

Conviction for murder upheld

Facts

The appellant was convicted of murder in the High Court of Tanganyika. The principal evidence against him was that of Felisita, an 11-year-old girl who claimed to be an eyewitness. Before testifying, she told the trial judge she was a Christian and knew liars would be punished by God, but did not know about taking an oath. The judge decided not to swear her and she gave evidence on affirmation. She testified that she saw the appellant strike the deceased Paskasia with a weapon. Immediately after witnessing the attack, she ran to Yohana's house and told him what she had seen, which was confirmed by Silveri and Kishankara who were present. Six days later she gave her first statement to police, initially denying she had gone to Paskasia's house, but later explaining she was afraid because Yohana had threatened her family. Police investigators admitted bringing considerable pressure to bear on the child through separation from her family and repeated questioning. Witnesses testified they saw the appellant coming from the direction of Paskasia's house carrying a bill-hook immediately before the alarm was raised, which he denied.

Issues

  1. Whether evidence given by a child witness on affirmation rather than oath requires corroboration.
  2. Whether previous contemporaneous statements by a witness can corroborate that witness's trial evidence.
  3. Whether the child witness ought to have been sworn.

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed.

Rules and key headnotes

Evidence — Child Witnesses — Evidence on Affirmation — Standard of Care Required
Evidence of a child given not upon oath but upon affirmation as required by s.146 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not strictly speaking require corroboration, but a court should be very careful before acting upon such evidence and should weigh and scrutinize it closely in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.
Evidence — Corroboration — Previous Contemporaneous Statements — Admissibility and Weight
Previous contemporaneous statements by a witness, rendered admissible by s.157 of the Indian Evidence Act, may afford corroboration of the witness's evidence at trial. The weight to be attached to such statements varies with the facts of each case and may be particularly important where the defence suggests that the trial evidence resulted from recent influences brought to bear upon the witness.
Evidence — Child Witnesses — Competency — Taking of Oath
Where a child witness aged about 11 states that she is a Christian and knows that liars would be punished by God but does not know about the taking of an oath, it is proper to have her sworn rather than merely affirmed.
Evidence — Contemporaneous Statements — Corroboration — Exclusion of Suggestion of Fabrication
Where a child witness makes substantially the same statement immediately after witnessing a crime, before any alarm has been raised or investigation commenced, such contemporaneous statement may dispose of the suggestion that the witness's account is something that police put into her mouth and provides good reason for believing the witness did in fact see what she says she saw.
Evidence — Child Witnesses — Discrepancies in Statements — Weight
Discrepancies as to details in a child witness's different statements to police and in evidence are only such as are to be expected from a person unlikely to be meticulously accurate in observation of details or in describing her own movements. Once it is believed the witness was not inventing when she said she saw the accused committing the act, such minor discrepancies become of little importance.

Legislation cited (2)

  • Criminal Procedure Code (Tanganyika) s.146
  • Indian Evidence Act s.157

Cases cited (2)

  • R v Bitashubirwe (10 EACA 78)
  • Muthukuraswami v R (1912 35 M 397)

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Rex v Rwakweba (Criminal Appeal No. 119 of 1943) [1943] EACA 37 (1 January 1943)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.