Wakilii

Singh v Godley (Civil Apeal No. 18 of 1942)

East African Court of Appeal · [1942] EACA 57 · 1942 Appeal Allowed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Civil appeal from magistrate's dismissal of claim for possession of dwelling-house
Decision
Possession granted to appellant landlord, effective 31st December 1942

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted possession to the landlord. The word 'himself' in proviso (iii) to Section 8(1)(d) does not require absolutely personal re-occupation; the question is whether the re-occupation is substantially the same as the pre-contract occupation. Where a landlord's wife and children would occupy the house as before, this satisfies the requirement even if the landlord was transferred elsewhere. A tenant under a fixed-term agreement of temporary nature cannot resist ejectment when the landlord wishes to re-occupy immediately upon termination of the contract.

Outcome

Possession granted to appellant landlord, effective 31st December 1942

Facts

The appellant, a Sub-Inspector of Police, owned and occupied a dwelling-house in Nairobi. Before going on leave, he entered into a written contract on 10th February 1941 with the respondent to lease the house for a fixed period of eleven months. The appellant returned from India before the eleven months expired and requested possession both verbally and in writing. The agreement expired on 15th January 1942. The appellant filed suit on 28th February 1942 seeking possession. By 15th April, the appellant had been transferred to Nyeri. The magistrate dismissed the claim, holding that the appellant did not come within the phrase requiring the landlord to 'himself' re-occupy the dwelling-house immediately upon termination of the contract.

Issues

  1. Whether the landlord was entitled to possession under proviso (iii) to Section 8(1)(d) of the Increase of Rent and of Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Ordinance 1940.
  2. Whether the word 'himself' in the proviso requires absolutely personal re-occupation by the landlord.
  3. Whether a tenant under a fixed-term agreement for temporary convenience is entitled to the benefit of the Act.

Orders

  • Appeal allowed.
  • Order for possession granted to operate as at 31st December 1942.
  • Respondent to pay taxed costs in this Court and the Court below.

Rules and key headnotes

Statutory Interpretation — Rent Restriction Legislation — Interpretation of 'Himself' in Landlord Re-occupation Provisions
The limitation of the word 'himself' in proviso (iii) to Section 8(1)(d) of the Increase of Rent and of Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Ordinance 1940 is not an absolutely personal limitation; the question is whether the re-occupation is substantially the same as the pre-contract occupation.
Land & Property — Landlord and Tenant — Re-occupation by Landlord's Family as Satisfying Personal Re-occupation Requirement
Where a landlord occupier returns from leave but is transferred to another part of the Colony, he may still require the occupation for himself if his wife and children would occupy the house as before; the re-occupation is substantially the same as the pre-contract occupation.
Statutory Interpretation — Rent Restriction Legislation — Purpose of 'Himself' Limitation
The use of the pronoun 'himself' in proviso (iii) to Section 8(1)(d) is intended to prevent an owner obtaining legal possession for the purpose of re-letting, not to impose an absolutely personal occupation requirement.
Land & Property — Landlord and Tenant — Fixed-term Tenancy for Temporary Convenience — No Notice Required
A tenant under an agreement for a fixed period of temporary nature, analogous to an agreement made for temporary convenience, cannot resist ejectment when the landlord wishes to re-occupy immediately upon termination of the contract; no notice to determine the agreement is required.
Statutory Interpretation — Rent Restriction Legislation — Time for Consideration of Landlord's Requirement
The time when the special tenancy comes to an end is the time for consideration of whether the landlord wishes to re-occupy the dwelling-house, not the time of the hearing or when the order is to be made.

Legislation cited (2)

  • Increase of Rent and of Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Ordinance 1940 s.8(1)(d)
  • Increase of Rent and of Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Ordinance 1940 s.8(1)(d) proviso (iii)

Cases cited (2)

  • Rinna v McCarthy (1925) 2 IR 157
  • Barret v Marshall (1920) 54 ILTR 214

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Singh v Godley (Civil Apeal No. 18 of 1942) [1942] EACA 57 (1 January 1942)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.