Wakilii

Tumuhimbise & Ors v Attorney General & Anor (Civil Suit No. 778 of 2003)

High Court · [2013] UGHCCD 128 · 2013 Suit Dismissed AI-generated summary ↓ Download Pin to watchlist Add to matter
Jurisdiction
Uganda
Case Type
Civil suit for recovery of value of lost property following eviction from game reserve, determined on preliminary objection that suit was time-barred
Decision
Suit dismissed on preliminary objection as time-barred

Observed later treatment

No later-treatment classification is recorded for this judgment.

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Holding

The court held that the suit was time-barred under Section 31 of the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, which requires actions in tort against government to be filed within two years. The limitation period runs from the date the cause of action arose until the suit is actually filed in the court registry, not from service of statutory notice. The plaintiffs' cause of action arose on 01/12/2001 but the suit was filed on 11/12/2003, outside the statutory period. The suit was dismissed with costs.

Outcome

Suit dismissed on preliminary objection as time-barred

Facts

The plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves and 198 others, claimed the value of properties lost when they were evicted from Katonga Wild Life Game Reserve on 01/12/2001 by the Chief Game Warden on the Minister's orders, on grounds they were occupying a Game Reserve. No compensation was paid. The plaintiffs served statutory notice on the Attorney General on 21/12/2001 and filed suit on 11/12/2003. The first defendant raised a preliminary objection that the suit was time-barred under Section 31 of the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, which requires actions in tort against government to be filed within two years of the cause of action arising.

Issues

  1. Whether the suit was time-barred under Section 31 of the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.
  2. Whether service of statutory notice on the Attorney General constitutes commencement of proceedings for purposes of computing the limitation period.
  3. Whether the cause of action constituted a continuous tort of trespass such that time did not run against the plaintiffs.

Orders

  • Suit dismissed.
  • Costs awarded to the defendants.

Rules and key headnotes

Civil Procedure — Limitation — Actions Against Government — Commencement of Limitation Period
The limitation period for actions in tort against government under Section 31 of the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act runs from the date the cause of action arose until the suit is actually filed in the court registry, not from the date of service of statutory notice on the Attorney General.
Civil Procedure — Institution of Suits — When a Suit is Considered Filed
A suit is not considered duly instituted until it is received by the court registry, stamped, assigned a case number, and entered in the court register. The filing of statutory notice on the Attorney General does not constitute commencement of proceedings for purposes of limitation.
Civil Procedure — Cause of Action — Determination from Pleadings
In determining whether a plaint discloses a particular cause of action, the court must look only at the plaint and its annexures, and must determine the cause of action from facts plainly appearing on the face of the plaint. A court cannot read into the plaint a cause of action that is not disclosed by the facts pleaded.
Civil Procedure — Limitation — Effect of Time Bar
A suit which is time-barred by statute must be rejected because the court is barred from granting relief. Statutes of limitation are strict and inflexible enactments intended to stifle litigation after a fixed period, irrespective of the merits of a particular case.

Legislation cited (6)

Cases cited (12)

  • Mathias Lwanga Kaganda v Uganda Electricity Board (Civil Suit No. 124 of 2003)
  • Sayikwo Murome v. Kuko & A'nor [1985] HCB 68
  • Vincent Rule Opio v. Attorney General, [1990-1991] KALR 68
  • Banco Arabe Espanol v Attorney General, Bank of Uganda (Civil Suit No. 527 of 1997)
  • Konksier v. B. Goodman Ltd. [1926] IKB 421
  • Eriyasafu Mudumba v Wilberforce Kuluse (Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1991)
  • Kapeeka Coffee Works Ltd & Another v NPART (Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 3 of 2000)
  • Attorney General v Maj Gen David Tinyenfuza (Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1997)
  • F.X Miramago v. Attorney General [1979] HCB 24
  • UNTA Exports Ltd. v. Customs [1970] E.A 648
  • Onesiforo Bamuwayira & 2 Or's v. Attorney General (1973) HCB 87
  • Hilton v.Satton Steam Laundry [1946] IKB 61

Full judgment

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The original judgment as reported. Read the original PDF before relying on any passage.

Tumuhimbise & Ors v Attorney General & Anor (Civil Suit No. 778 of 2003) [2013] UGHCCD 128 (26 September 2013)
Source: this page presents Wakilii’s issue analysis and metadata for a publicly reported Ugandan judgment. Any AI-generated summary is marked as such. Judgment text is sourced from the Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii.org). Wakilii is not affiliated with ULII.